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Sammendrag 
Produksjon og salg av LNG har tradisjonelt vært sikret med langsiktige kontrakter på grunn 
av store investeringer. I de senere år har spot og kortsiktig salg blitt stadig mer brukt til å 
balansere etterspørselsendringer påvirket av globale begivenheter. Likevel er markedet ikke 
effektivt, og det er tydelige prisforskjeller mellom de regionale markedene. 
 
Transport av LNG tilbyr fleksibilitet og er den viktigste delen av verdikjeden. Denne 
oppgaven ser på verdien av å investere i et LNG-skip for en norsk produsent. Fire fiktive 
caser ble laget for å undersøke verdien av å ta risiko, dvs. selge på spot i stedet for langsiktige 
avtaler. Hvert case representerte forskjellig risikostyring og reiseavhengige alternativer. De 
fire casene var varianter av eksport til Storbritannia og Japan. En tidsseriemodell ble tilpasset 
til hver av de historiske prisene i de to markedene. Tre ulike prisscenarioer ble lagd ut fra de 
statistiske prognosene og en strategisk industrianalyse.  
 
Casene ble først analysert hver for seg ved å finne netto nåverdi og internrente. For å kunne 
konkludere hva verdiforskjellen mellom salg på spot eller terminkontrakt ble Δ nåverdi 
sammenlignet i de forskjellige prisscenarioene. Undersøkelsen fant spotsalg til Storbritannia, i 
både medium og høyt prisscenario til å gi en mye høyere avkastning. Bare i det pessimistiske 
scenarioet viste en sikret posisjon å gi den høyest nåverdi. Det var interessant å finne at det 
britiske markedet ga en høyere avkastning enn det japanske. Dette skyldes den store 
forskjellen i antall dager som kreves for en rundtur og volumene som transporteres.   
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Abstract 
Producing and selling LNG has traditionally been hedged with long-term contracts due to the 
massive investments required. In recent years spot and short-term sales has been increasingly 
used to balance demand changes affected by world events. Yet, the market is not effective, 
and there are evident price differences between the regional markets.  
 
Transportation of LNG offers flexibility and is the most important part of the value chain. 
This paper looks at the value of investing in a LNG carrier for a Norwegian producer. To 
investigate the value of taking risk, i.e. selling on spot, instead of long-term sales and 
purchase agreements, four fictional cases were created. Each case represented different risk 
management positions and voyage alternatives. The four cases were variations of export to 
UK and Japan. A time series model was fitted to each of the historical prices in the two 
markets. The statistical forecasts from the two models were further supplied with judgmental 
forecasting based on a strategic industry analysis, creating three different price scenarios.  
 
The cases were analyzed by finding a net present value and internal rate of return. To make a 
conclusion the Δ net present value of selling on spot and forward contract was compared in 
different future price scenarios, and thereby representing the increased value. The research 
found spot sales to the UK, in both medium and high price scenarios to yield a much higher 
return. Only the bearish scenario proved a hedged position to give the highest net present 
value. It was interesting to find that the UK market gave a higher total return than the 
Japanese. This was due to the major difference in days required for a round trip and the 
volumes transported.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The LNG (liquefied natural gas) industry is characterized by very cost-intensive assets. Its 
development started off slowly, as most of the natural gas volume historically has been tied 
up in pipelines with long-term contracts. Reduced costs and technological refinement has in 
the later years made LNG a commercial and viable alternative. To justify the massive 
investments, trading of LNG has been defined by bilateral long-term contracts of 20+ years 
duration.  
 
Since the early 2000s it has become a regular observation that regional gas markets are 
increasingly influenced by events in different parts of the world. The shale gas revolution in 
the United States, the economic recession in Europe, green energy politics, increased demand 
from non-OECD countries and the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan have all had impacts 
on gas supply, demand and pricing. The correlation between price spikes and historic events 
is obvious, and has caused price differences between the regional markets. However, no major 
market in today’s globalized world acts totally independent from one another. Low flexibility 
offered by pipeline infrastructure has caused a significant increase in trade volumes of LNG 
to support the demand growth for natural gas globally. The growth, triggered partly by 
electricity and gas industry liberalization, has increased investments in liquefaction, 
regasification and LNG shipping capacity (IGU, 2014). 
 
The thought of converging gas prices was a widespread conjecture not so long ago. In a 
perfect market the only differences in price between regional markets is the cost connected to 
the transportation of LNG. The idea that international trade of LNG could connect major 
geographically distanced markets and link their prices is a long way from the reality today. 
Japan’s shutdown of nuclear reactors after the Fukushima disaster in 2011 has intensified the 
already high energy demand in the Asian market. One could say that Japan’s energy deficit is 
driving the Asian LNG price. The disparity between the regional markets has presented the 
possibility of executing arbitrage. Applying the arbitrage pricing theory, the market should 
not allow for such persisting arbitrage opportunities. However, three years after the disaster, 
the regional price differences are still evident. During the spring of 2014, the price has been 
around 5 USD/mmBtu in the United States (US), and almost 4 times higher in Japan, at just 
short of 20 USD/mmBtu. The European price has been somewhere in the middle at 11 
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USD/mmBtu (Platts, 2014). Compared to other energy commodities this price spread is 
significant, and has caused momentum among traders and suppliers to take advantage of it.  
 
According to natural gas analyst Terje Halmø, Norway has a reason to be worried. He claims 
that in order to improve the prospects of revenue in the future, Norway and Statoil has to look 
towards the Asian market (Tollaksen, 2014). Norway as a supplier of natural gas has tied up 
95% of its volumes via pipelines to Europe (NPD, 2014). This could put Norway in a risky 
situation in regards to market-exposure and price volatility, as a price drop of only 1 
USD/mmBtu in Europe could mean an and annual income loss of 20 billion NOK (Tollaksen, 
2013). By focusing more on LNG and the possibility of shipping through the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR), the dependence could be reduced while increasing the pressure on the European 
market.  
 
The solution seems obvious. However, utilizing the higher prices offered in the Asian market 
requires ability of doing so, and that could be difficult, as most of the volumes have been 
managed through long-term agreements. Conversely, there is an ongoing shift towards more 
trade in spot and short-term markets, which now make up 33% of total LNG sales (IGU, 
2014). 
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The trade of LNG is highly affected by prices and global events. This market risk has had a 
great influence on the risk management in the industry. The widespread use of long-term 
agreements reflects the actors’ risk appetite and the preferring of safe and steady cash flows.    
Despite the flexibility, LNG has therefore been regarded as a floating pipeline. Yet, volatile 
prices and significant price spreads between the regional markets has increasingly 
strengthened the role of spot and short-term sales. Even though Europe and Asia have great 
distances between them, cargo-diversions from Europe to Asia has been done both 
successfully and profitable. Norway exports 5% of their natural gas as LNG, and is in a great 
position to supply them both. However, spot export is also highly affected by the cost of 
transportation.   
 
On this basis we have chosen the following research question: 
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 What is the increased value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot instead of a 
long-term contract for a Norwegian producer? 
 
To help us properly investigate the increased value we have formulated a set of sub research 
questions: 
 What is the value of investing in a ship selling LNG on a long-term contract to the 
European market for a Norwegian producer? 
 
 What is the value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot or short-term contracts 
to the European market for a Norwegian producer? 
 
 What is the value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot or short-term contracts 
to the Japanese market for a Norwegian producer? 
 
 What is the value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot or short-term contracts 
to the European and/or Japanese market for a Norwegian producer? 
 
 Is there an added value of having the possibility to export LNG with spot or short-
term contracts versus having a secure long-term contract towards Europe? 
 
The approach of this master thesis is from a Norwegian natural gas supply view, with LNG 
export possibilities from the Snøhvit field in Hammerfest. The producer of LNG will invest in 
a LNG carrier for export restricted to Milford Haven in the United Kingdom (UK), or 
Yokohama in Japan. By using a forward contract we remove the risk of fluctuations in market 
prices, but at the same time commit to always deliver to the same port. Selling on spot allows 
us to monetize the highest price in the markets, while being exposed to market risk. Given 
different price scenarios created, selling on spot could yield the highest net present value of 
investing in a ship. 
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1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters: 
1. Introduction 
2. Liquefied natural gas 
3. Natural gas markets 
4. Methodology 
5. Presentation of the cases 
6. Strategic industry analysis 
7. Price forecasts 
8. Investment analysis 
9. Conclusion 
 
After the introduction we will describe the LNG industry and what liquefied natural gas is. 
Then, in chapter 3 we will explain factors that affect the natural gas price, and clarify the price 
situation in the regional markets. In the methodology chapter we go through the choice of 
research design, data used, and the method for price forecasting and analyzing an investment. 
Thereafter, we present the four different cases used in the investment analysis. In order to do a 
good investment decision, and to supply the statistical forecasts, we conduct a strategic 
analysis of the LNG industry in chapter 6. In chapter 7 we analyze historical prices, and fit a 
model to create forecasts. These are merged with judgmental forecasting, making three 
different price scenarios: high, medium and low. In the investment analysis we go through the 
assumptions, which lay the basis for costs and cost of capital for the different cases. The cases 
will then be analyzed to answer the sub research questions. Lastly, in the conclusion we will 
compare the analyses of the cases and use them to answer the main research question.  
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2 LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
This chapter will give will give a description of the LNG industry. The focus will lie on the 
value chain and its key components: Storage and transportation, as this positions LNG as the 
flexible option. Further, we will define LNG arbitrage occurring from the price spreads, and 
some of the main features of LNG trading. 
 
2.1 THE ROLE OF LNG 
LNG possesses a number of advantages, including flexibility and ease of transport. These are 
the reason for its growth, and will be instrumental in the years to come, especially to meet 
Asian demand. Over the last 30 years the demand for natural gas has been rising at an average 
rate of almost 3% per year (Total, 2012). It is also projected to be playing an important role in 
the global energy mix in the future.  
 
LNG has appeared as an increasingly core feature of the global gas balance during the past 
two decades. Since the year 2000, the growth of LNG use has been roughly 8% per year 
(Total, 2012). LNG’s contribution to meeting increased natural gas demand has been growing 
continuously. Even though LNG trade fell by 1,6% in 2012, compared to 2011, after 30 years 
of uninterrupted growth, it amounts to almost 10% of global gas consumption (IGU, 2014). In 
2012 the trade flow was 237,7 million tons (MT), where of which Japan and Korea imported 
52%, up from 4% in 2011 (GIIGNL, 2013). Total, one of the most experienced LNG actors 
and a world-class player, projects that the LNG production will expand steadily to 370 MT in 
2020 (Total, 2014a).  
 
LNG is liquefied natural gas coming from petroleum production. In order to make natural gas 
liquid is has to be cooled down until it reaches a temperature of -163°C. It then occupies only 
1/600
th
 of its normal gaseous volume at atmospheric pressure (Linde Engineering, 2014). 
Building a plant that is able to cool down the gas like this is costly. However, by doing so, 
practical transportation across great distances becomes possible when there are geological 
and/or political barriers that do not allow the construction of pipelines. When the LNG carrier 
(LNGC) reaches its destination, the LNG is returned to gaseous form at a regasification 
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facility by heating it up. Thereafter it is piped to homes, businesses and industries, just as any 
other natural gas.  
 
2.1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE LNG VALUE CHAIN   
 
 
Figure 2.1: The LNG Value chain (GIIGNL, 2014). 
 
The different stages of the LNG value chain can generally de described by the following: 
 Natural gas production: the process of finding and producing natural gas for delivery 
to a processing facility.  
 Liquefaction: the conversion of natural gas into a liquid state so that it can be 
transported in ships.  
 Transportation: the shipment of LNG in specially designed ships for delivery to 
markets. The key component of the value chain. 
 Regasification: conversion of the LNG back to the gaseous form by passing the 
cryogenic liquid through vaporizers at receiving terminals. 
 Storage: LNG waiting for shipping at the liquefaction plant. LNG receiving terminals 
and regasification facilities also store LNG before it is re-gasified for pipeline 
transportation or reloaded to another LNGC.  
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 Distribution and delivery of natural gas goes through the national natural gas pipeline 
system to the end users.  
 
2.2 LNG TRADING 
LNG can be sold at any step of the value chain. Predominantly it is sold under long-term 
contracts between liquefaction plants and gas marketers and/or power producers. According 
to Total (2014b) signing sales and purchase agreements (SPA) is imperative to building 
liquefaction facilities, because they determine the economic viability of the project, which 
usually is an investment of several billion dollars. SPAs enable risk sharing, between the LNG 
sellers carrying the price risk and buyers whom the volume risk is transferred to. Spot trading 
of LNG emerged about a decade ago, with the deregulation of the gas market in Europe, and 
the growth of LNG production and transport capacity. The change in market conditions has 
given market players an increasing degree of flexibility. 
 
Long-term contracts are still central in the LNG industry, but some significant changes have 
taken place in the latest years. The destination clause, which has been standard in long-term 
contracts, was eliminated from some new-signed contracts to increase flexibility (Hartley, 
2013). In addition, the number of uncommitted LNG ships has been increasing. LNG shipping 
is crucial for LNG trade, and with a limited number of vessels not committed to SPAs, the 
possibility for LNG spot trade also becomes limited.  
 
2.2.1 LNG ARBITRAGE 
It has even become more acceptable in the industry for contractually committed LNG, with a 
specific destination, to be diverted to another market through a mutual agreement between 
seller and buyer.  
 
An arbitrage in a commodity is the profit making market activity of simultaneous buying and 
selling in different markets or in derivative in order to take advantage of differing in prices for 
the same asset, making a riskless profit (Eydeland and Wolyniec 2003).  
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A study done by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies interpreted LNG arbitrage as follows:  
 
LNG Arbitrage can be defined as a physical cargo diversion from one market to 
another, which offers a higher price. The diversion of the cargo can be regarded as 
arbitrage if the cargo was initially committed to the first market and to the initial buyer 
in a commercial contract (Zhuravleva, 2009: 2). 
 
The key driver for LNG arbitrage is commercial, and is obviously induced by the economic 
motivation to take advantage of price differentials between markets caused by supply and 
demand imbalances and market inefficiencies.   
 
To make the above definition clearer we are going to illustrate an arbitrage model from a 
seller’s perspective. Firstly, we are going to technically illustrate how an arbitrage would 
happen in the LNG market. The seller of LNG has an initial contract agreement towards a 
market, a long-term, short-term or spot contract. If the seller then has the ability to sell LNG 
to another market with a higher price for the same commodity, then there is a possibility to 
lock in an arbitrage profit. However, it is important for the seller that the price spread between 
the markets is higher than the transportation cost in order to make it a profitable transaction. If 
this is the case, the seller then makes a cargo diversion, selling the initial contracted load 
towards the market with higher price. But, in order to make this transaction happen, the seller 
is dependent on a third actor. Since the seller has contract obligations towards the initial 
buyer, he has to provide natural gas from another source, for instance LNG spot or local 
natural gas. Summing up from the descriptive explanation, LNG arbitrage requires: 
 
           
            
 
Where:  
     – LNG price at the end buyer’s market  
    – Price of LNG at the spot market  
      – Price of the LNG at the local gas market 
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Figure 2.2: Arbitrage model from a seller’s perspective (based on Zhuravleva, 2009). 
 
The previous section was a purely technical description of an arbitrage; however there are 
often contractual clauses, which can spoil profitable opportunities. Destination clauses and ex-
ship contractual terms make arbitrage almost impossible. If such terms exist, which they often 
do in the LNG industry, there is the possibility of sharing the arbitrage profit with the initial 
buyer in order to break the contract clause. 
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Figure 2.3: Arbitrage model from a seller’s perspective with contractual limitations (own 
model). 
 
2.2.2 SPOT AND SHORT-TERM MARKET 
It was only after 2005 that the spot and short-term trade started to experience growth. By that 
time its share of the total LNG trade had grown to 8%, whereas before 2000 it consisted only 
of a negligible part (IGU, 2014).  During the years 2007 until 2010, the spot and short-term 
trade accounted for 17% to 20% of total trade. The years of 2011 and 2012 had an array of 
factors that drove the LNG spot and short-term market to new heights. These factors include 
(IGU, 2014): 
 The large growth of the LNG fleet, which made the long-haul transportations to the 
spot market possible. Mainly from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  
 The increased use of destination flexibility in the contracts. Primarily form the 
Atlantic Basin and Qatar.   
 The new permutations and linkages between buyers and sellers as a consequence of 
the increase in number of exporters and importers.  
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 The significant increase in demand in Asia and South America. 
 The lack of domestic production or infrastructure supporting pipeline imports in 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, meaning they have to resort to the spot market to manage 
any sudden changes in demand, e.g. Fukushima incident and its implications. 
 The sustained violation of parity between prices in the different basins, making the 
arbitrage opportunities a high-ranking part of the monetization strategy.  
 The relative decrease of gas competitiveness to other fuels, mainly in Europe from the 
economic crisis and the increased competitiveness of coal. The latter is closely related 
to the so-called shale gas revolution in the US, which freed up volumes of gas to be to 
be re-directed elsewhere. In addition, it dramatically decreased coal’s competitiveness 
in the US, leading to increased use of coal in Europe.  
 
2.2.3 LNG RELOADING 
Reloading of an already discharged LNG cargo back onto a carrier for export appears 
illogical. However, this practice has become an increasingly important factor driving LNG 
flows from Europe over the last two years. Reloading activity mainly relates to deliveries of 
LNG that are bound to specific locations by contractual constraints.  Even though this 
evidently is inefficient, significant profits have been made by reloading gas from Spain, 
Belgium and France for export to higher priced markets (GIIGNL, 2013).  
 
There are two main reasons for reloading in Europe (Timera Energy, 2013b). Firstly, many 
LNG supply contracts have fixed destination clause constraints. The delivery is ex ship 
(DES). Secondly, there is a premium for Asian LNG spot over European gas prices. Only a 
subset of the LNG supply contracts to Europe has fixed destination clauses. The majority of 
the LNG supply into European receiving terminals is contractually divertible as said in the 
SPA, or alternatively by renegotiation between seller and buyer.  The inflexible supply 
contracts are to Spain, France and Portugal, including Qatari supply to the Belgian Zeebrugge 
terminal (Timera Energy, 2013b). Even if there is a DES agreement, after it is discharged in to 
the storage tanks it belongs to the receiver/terminal capacity user and can then be shipped 
anywhere. This has led to adaptation to terminals, enabling them to re-load from the storage 
tanks into a LNGC, not purely for discharging.  
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2.3 THE LIQUEFACTION PROCESS 
Just as with crude oil, natural gas can be of different qualities. Natural gas from the wellhead 
contains a mixture of methane and heavier hydrocarbon gases, including small quantities of 
other unwanted components. These are nitrogen, helium, carbon dioxide, sulfur compounds 
and water. Before any liquefaction process can take place, the natural gas has to be treated. 
The pre-treatment involves removing the unwanted components and separating some of the 
heavier components. By doing so there will not be any solids formed when the gas is cooled 
down. This also makes the product compatible with the end users LNG specification, i.e. 
heating value. Gas interchangeability and heating value will be discussed later on. It also 
reduces the transportation volume. Normally, the end product consists of 85-95% methane, 
with some ethane, propane, butane and traces of nitrogen, depending on where it is produced, 
and where it is planned to be used (Statoil, 2009). As LNG is mostly methane, it shares its 
attributes, being odorless, colorless, non-corrosive and non-poisonous. NGL, LPG, 
condensate or pure components of ethane, propane and butane are sometimes extracted and 
fractioned in tailor made processing plants because of their potential higher sales value in 
some regional markets.  
 
2.4 ADVANTAGES 
The increased use of natural gas can be explained by its more environmental friendly footprint 
and its potential energy. The combustion releases less greenhouse gas than the other fossil 
fuels, and does not leave any unburned residues, soot or particulates. The high calorific value 
in natural gas allows power plants using latest technology to achieve high energy efficiency 
through cogeneration and combined cycle configurations, reducing both energy consumption 
and emissions.  
 
One of the main reasons for the LNG sector to emerge is that LNG allows transport of gas in a 
technically and economically manner. Firstly, the use of LNG offers an alternative to the cost 
and challenges related to building a pipeline infrastructure. The LNG value chain creates 
opportunities for gas-producing and gas-consuming countries. Huge reserves located far from 
the consumer zones can be exploited by exporting LNG with tankers. Meaning that 
liquefaction of natural gas creates new market opportunities, and generates revenues that will 
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stimulate the economy of the producing country. In addition, liquefaction offers an alternative 
to gas flaring associated with crude oil production. The LNG value chain also enables 
consumer countries to diversify their energy supply, and thereby reduce their energy 
dependence on the producing countries that supply via pipelines. As opposed to gas 
transportation through a pipeline, LNG cargoes can be diverged en route. This promotes the 
flexibility that the consumers need to manage their supply, and enables the producers to 
optimize the commercial value of their assets. Increased short-term LNG trading related to 
market deregulation has stimulated the flexibility.  
 
2.5 CHALLENGES 
The LNG sector is complex and capital-intensive. Managing a project will demand a 
comprehensive expertise, which only a few operators possess. There are considerable 
investments needed to developing LNG projects. Implementing a typical 8 MTPA LNG chain 
between the Middle East and Europe will come to about 17 billion dollars, normally broken 
down like this (Total, 2014b):  
 1.5 billion USD to develop the gas fields that will supply the plant 
 12.5 billion USD to build the liquefaction complex 
 2.5 billion USD to build ten LNGC 
 0.5 billion USD for the regasification of the cargoes 
 
Being able to handle such enormous projects financially is one thing, but there are numerous 
and diverse inter-dependent fields of expertise required to investing and managing such 
expensive projects. The know-how needed reflects the projects scale and range of risk. The 
technical competence must cover the whole value chain: exploration and production of 
resources (natural gas or gas associated with oilfields), liquefaction, process engineering, 
plant configuration engineering, construction and management of a LNGC, safety of shipping 
operations, ensuring safe integration into the environment (sometimes in harsh climate, e.g. 
arctic or desert regions) and more (Total, 2014b). Due to the complexity of these large-scale 
projects, a solid and contractual framework to implement and involve a range of different 
players, disciplines and businesses is needed. Further, the extensive knowledge about the 
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global gas markets and the ability to forecast price trends are necessities for bargaining about 
long-term LNG sales contracts.  
 
Lastly, the time needed from the first planning phases, throughout to the first delivery of the 
first cargo will require a long-term investment capacity. The “simplest” project takes about 
ten years. Even before any construction of a plant can start, which itself takes about four to 
five years, it will take at least five years to secure all the conditions required to do the final 
investment decision. These conditions include (Total, 2014b):   
 Securing gas supply to the liquefaction plant (certification of reserves, design of the 
development scheme, agreements on the shares of each supplier, signing of gas supply 
agreements, etc.). 
 Guaranteeing supply to markets via long-term SPA, normally with terms of twenty 
years and longer. 
 Establishing plant ownership. 
 Finding the “optimal” technical design of the liquefaction process and plant facilities. 
 Defining the fleet of carriers that will be used for transportation. 
 Securing future access to regasification terminals for cargoes. 
 Organize a financing plan for the whole project. 
 
Summed up, managing a huge project at this kind of scale requires optimal synergy between 
the many interdependent and complementary fields of expertise involved.   
 
2.6 TECHNICAL DISADVANTAGES 
Durr et al. (2005) point out that cooling natural gas down has its disadvantages. Firstly, the 
energy and the processing equipment required to reduce the temperature is expensive. Usually 
10% of the natural gas from the feedstock must be burned to provide the energy needed for 
the cooling process. Seawater, freshwater and air are used as cooling mediums, often in 
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combination. The amount of fuel used will differ from plant to plant, but the energy needed is 
still significant and cooling machinery is expensive. 
 
Secondly, handling the low temperature requires special materials. While pipelines operating 
in ambient temperatures can be made out of carbon steel, LNG has to be stored in more 
expensive materials like aluminum, stainless steel and high nickel steel. Hence, storage and 
transportation of LNG is more costly than transportation of other hydrocarbon products.  
 
2.7 THE ECONOMY OF SCALE OF LIQUEFYING NATURAL GAS 
The first commercial liquefaction plant was in Arzew, Algeria in 1964, even though the 
technology had existed for decades (Center for Energy Economics, 2014). The capacity of the 
Algerian LNG train (liquefaction and purification facility) was 0,4 MTPA. In 2004 Conoco 
Phillips did a technical study of train sizes, where 5 MTPA came out as most cost effective 
(Eaton et al., 2004).
 
They also concluded that the size of a single LNG train of 8 MTPA was 
feasible, and would be most suitable for expanding plants targeting distant markets. This 
would also require an almost unlimited gas supply. Today, 10 years later, the Qatargas 2 plant 
consists of two LNG trains with the capacity of 7,8 MTPA each (Qatargas, 2014a). The 
reason for this development of greater sizes is advancements in train technology and design, 
which has improved the economy of scale.  
 
The actual breakdown of the costs is highly dependent on the plant (Durr, et. al., 2005). The 
plant capacity determines to some extent the size of the storage and loading facilities, which 
again sets the ship size. Increasing the train capacity, without increasing the size of LNG 
storage and loading, would improve the total plant cost. However, this would also lead to a 
requirement of more frequent ship loadings. 
 
According to Kotzot et al. (2007) the total cost for a LNG plant can vary by 100% or more 
and are highly dependent on site-specific factors. These are geographical location, technical 
specifications and financing. Even though the technicality may be the same, a different 
location results in different ambient air temperature or closeness to the customers. For 
example, given the same plant configurations a 5
o
C higher temperature profile will decrease 
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the production by roughly 4% (Kotzot et al., 2007). Therefore it seems logical that no plant is 
identical, and that both capital expenditures and variable cost differ.  
 
Even though it seems like the primary driver of the total plant cost is the LNG train, it is not 
so. Caswell et al. (2012) emphasize that the LNG train is an important component of the costs, 
but the civil and infrastructure costs are the largest of them. These include: 
 Soil improvement: blasting rock, clearing land, and driving piles 
 Seismic protection for LNG tanks, equipment, structures, and buildings 
 Marine terminal development: jetty length and depth, dredging, and tug support 
 Accommodation villages: permanent and temporary housing support 
 
The cost of construction is primarily driven by the location, and it is a combination of man-
hours, labor cost and productivity over four to five years. However, the important thing to 
remember is that even though if two LNG plants were to have the same production capacity, 
these projects would not be guaranteed to be of similar cost. For example, the construction 
costs of current LNG projects in Australia are typically two to three times higher than for 
other locations (Songhurst, 2014).  
 
2.8 KEY COMPONENTS OF THE VALUE CHAIN  
2.8.1 STORAGE 
At both liquefaction, and receiving and regasification facilities LNG can be stored. Since 
temperature and pressure are directly proportional to each other, the tanks used to store LNG 
have to keep the liquid cold and independent of pressure. This is done in insulated double-
walled tanks, specifically made to hold LNG. If the vapors are not released, the pressure and 
the temperature within a tank will keep on rising. To keep the temperature constant (auto-
refrigeration) the boil-off gas (BOG) is allowed to escape the tank, and is then collected to be 
used as fuel or cooled down again (National Grid, 2014). In other words, as long as auto-
refrigeration is done, LNG can be stored as long as desired. The cost however, would be 
depending on the fuel price and the lack of storage for further supply or production of LNG. 
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As there are several kinds of storage tanks to choose from, the decision of which to use is 
usually based on the land available and cost (Durr et al., 2005). All of them have secondary 
spill containments, which defines the primary difference between the single, double, and full 
containment. The secondary containment ensures that any leak or spill is fully contained and 
isolated from any public near an onshore LNG plant. Tank capacities of 140 000 – 160 000 
m
3
 are common, but the industry has started using up to 200 000 m
3
 storage tanks (Durr et al., 
2005).  
 
2.8.2 TRANSPORTATION 
Pipelines vs. LNG 
Energy distribution is an extremely important component in the petroleum value chain. 
Natural gas is considered abundant; however more than one-third of global reserves are 
classified as stranded (Energytribune, 2007). In order to monetize these resources, economic 
ways of distributing are necessary.  
 
For offshore transportation of natural gas, pipelines are the most common. However, for 
longer distances, e.g. between regional markets, pipelines are too costly. The general 
guideline is that LNG-transportation breaks even with onshore pipelines at 3200 km and with 
offshore pipelines at 1600 km (Durr et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Gas transportation costs (Durr et al., 2005) 
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In determining the most economic transportation method for natural gas, distance and volume 
are key factors to consider. LNG is more competitive for long-distance routes compared to a 
pipeline, as overall costs are less affected by distance. Supplying natural gas form Middle 
East to Europe through LNG allows a cost saving of up to 30% measured up against pipelines. 
LNG rarely competes directly with pipelines because of economic-zones and field size, which 
also comes into play in the evaluation of distribution.  
 
LNG shipping 
The shipping of LNG is very much alike onshore storing, except on a vessel. Just as the 
storage tanks, the ships have insulation to limit the amount of evaporates. This BOG is 
sometimes used as a supplement fuel for the carrier. Today, the “standard” cargo size for 
LNGCs is considered to be around 155 000 m
3
 (GIIGNL, 2013). However, a LNG vessel’s 
size can be much larger. Qatargas has in recent years pioneered the development of LNG 
carriers, with sizes up to 266 000m
3
 (Qatargas, 2014b). In 2013, the ships ordered had an 
average capacity of 165 000 m
3
 (IGU, 2014). Today, the majority of LNG ships have been 
designed to carry LNG either in spherical tank (Moss sphere design) or in geometric 
membrane tanks (membrane design). This technology is also be used for floating storage and 
regasification units (FSRU), described later under 2.9 Technological developments 
 
Using larger ships improves the economies of scale, as they will be able to transport the same 
planned quantity in fewer trips. However, not every facility can receive larger ships. 
Modifications to the facility can be done at a fairly low cost, but the water depth could create 
troubles. If the water is to shallow, the cost jumps are based on the geographical contours and 
condition, and site location (Durr et al., 2005). 
 
Transportation is a critical component of the LNG supply chain. Being part of an extensive 
long-term planning, carriers are usually built specifically for a project, and could almost be 
referred to as a floating pipeline. Increased spot and short-term trade has led to some players 
designating a small number of LNGC specifically for LNG spot cargo trade. The cost of 
shipping a LNG cargo is determined by very physical scrutiny of logistics and constraints. 
The shipping costs also influence the global gas flows and pricing dynamics heavily. This 
means that they are the key driver of the potential value created by moving gas between 
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different locations, and the level of price spreads between regions in the global gas market. 
Over the last two years the shipping costs have played a particularly important role in decision 
making about cargo diversion to markets with higher prices, as global gas prices diverged post 
Fukushima. The latest publication about the LNG industry by GIIGNL (2013) supports this, 
and says that both short- and mid-term charter rates remained high during 2012 (just as in 
2011), at around 120 000 USD/day and as much as 150 000 USD/day for a conventional 
carrier of 155 000 m
3
. The costs are also a key to understanding to what extent global prices 
will converge in the future.  
 
After the increase of short-term contracts and spot trades, the demand for LNG shipping 
capacity can be broken down into two main drivers (Timera Energy, 2014): 
1. LNG volume  – Higher LNG demand is causing a higher demand for shipping 
capacity 
2. Average travelling time and the proportion of ballast voyages. With a higher number 
of LNG voyages we get a higher proportion of ballast voyages, requiring more 
shipping capacity to move a given volume of LNG 
 
In other words, the LNG shipping capacity and shipping charts are fairly correlated with LNG 
supply and demand, which again are affected by global events. Costs in the LNG shipping 
industry are expected to be linked to the price for natural gas, if the increased capacity of 
vessels matches demand for LNG. If there is a surplus of vessels the shipping capacity is 
likely to go down because of increased competition between shipping companies. Vice versa 
if there is a vessel deficit, which is expected to increase shipping cost due to more competition 
for shipping volume.  
 
Globally the LNG fleet consisted of 357 vessels
1
 at the end of 2013, while the order book 
contained 108 vessels. Most of these were ordered in 2011 and 2012 in the anticipation of a 
higher demand for LNG transportation, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. In addition, 
the cyclically weak new-build prices led to a burst of orders LNG projects or LNG off-taker 
charters instead of signing premium charter deals. Although the fear of a shipping supply glut 
                                                          
1
 Includes only those above 18 000 m
3 
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reduced this speculative ordering, an excess supply is expected to put a downward pressure on 
the charter rates in 2014 (IGU, 2014).  
 
2.9 TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
2.9.1 FLOATING STORAGE AND REGASIFICATION UNIT 
Floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) is a floating LNG import terminal, which has 
the capacity to both store and regasify gas from liquid form. With regasification built into the 
LNG ship, it offers a lot more versatility than a regular LNG ship. Regular ships are 
dependent on terminals in order to re/degasify and on/offload. Hence, FSRUs are more costly 
than a LNGC (Schaefer, 2012). FSRU’s newfound attractiveness in the LNG industry is 
understandable when considering the application compared to regular LNGCs and onshore 
terminals.  
 
A FSRU can be ordered, made and delivered in 2-3 years. Whereas an onshore receiving 
terminal, from planned to it is in operation, takes 5-7 years (Schaefer, 2012). In an LNG 
market with high demand and high prices in the Asian-Pacific region, delivery time is 
essential. In addition, the land-based terminals can cost approximately 700 million USD. Not 
only do FSRUs get to the market faster, but they are also more economical to build. A new 
vessel costs roughly 260 million USD, and there is also a possibility to convert old LNGCs 
for about 160 million USD with 14-16 months delivery time (Schaefer, 2012).  
 
A highly important benefit is the flexibility offered by a FSRU. Since it is not stationary it can 
be moved to where demand is highest and most profitable, while planned use can help reduce 
market fluctuations, such as seasonal demand. Also in areas characterized by political and/or 
economic instability, these vessels are an advantage, as they can just sail away if those 
elements become too strong. Another major benefit is that FSRUs is not dependent on costly 
onshore facilities. It only needs modified grid terminals, which is a fraction of the price of a 
receiving terminal. General cost comparisons must however be treated with caution. 
Circumstances surrounding floating and land-based constructions can affect the costs 
significantly, but in general FSRUs may provide faster return on capital (Gupta, 2012).   
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One big drawback with these units compared to onshore facilities is less regasification 
capacity. Most have a peak capacity of around 500 million cubic feet per day, compared to 
onshore, which has twice the peak capacity. There is no doubt that the FSRUs have created 
bigger opportunities and flexibility in the LNG value chain. With transportation becoming 
easier this may also allow LNG spot markets to expand (Lingga, 2012). 
 
2.9.2 FLOATING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
Floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) refers to a floating LNG facility. This involves 
production of LNG directly at a gas field on a floating production, storage and offloading 
(FPSO) vessel. While being able to store products, LNGC will have to pull alongside, load, 
and then transport it to the market.  
 
As of today, no FLNG vessel is yet to be completed. Shell is currently building the Prelude 
FLNG, which will produce LNG off the coast of Australia to supply Asia’s growing demand 
(Shell, 2014a). The hull has been completed and is the world’s largest floating vessel, and will 
probably be the first FLNG (Thomson Reuters, 2013).  While being able to withstand strong 
weather conditions and giant waves the Prelude is planned to produce at least 5,3 MTPA of 
gas liquids, whereof which 3,6 MTPA is LNG.  
 
By moving the liquefaction process offshore it avoids the potential environmental impact of 
constructing and operating on land, and laying pipelines (Shell, 2014b). The total cost is then 
reduced as the civil and infrastructure costs are avoided. Despite the flexibility FLNG offers 
as a supply solution, building such vessel could be very costly. Debney (2008) suggests that 
FLNG projects may face large cost over-runs that could occur due to changes in design and 
re-engineering. Shell has withheld any estimates of Prelude’s cost but is speculated to end up 
around 10-12 billion USD (Thomson Reuters, 2013). Therefore, it will end up at a bit less cost 
as a land-based plant. The major difference will be the extended inter-dependent expertise 
required and the new potential risks, but also increased flexibility as it can move around. 
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2.10 GAS INTERCHANGEABILITY 
Gas quality is relevant for both pipeline integrity and combustion, and is specified in terms of 
requirements. Gas interchangeability however, is only concerned with the combustion, so that 
gas appliances can perform adequately without compromising the safety, efficiency and 
operability (Williams, 2009). There are two measures of natural gas properties used for 
interchangeability: 1) Heating value (HHV) and 2) Wobbe Index (WI) (Durr et al. 2004). 
HHV of gas is a measure of the heat released from the combustion for a given amount of gas 
molecules. Essentially this is the British Thermal Unit (BTU), which is the unit used when 
selling gas. A BTU is the amount of heat energy needed to raise the temperature of one pound 
of water by one degree. Not unlike, the WI is a measure of heating value where gravity is 
taken into account. Natural gas is mainly methane, and some ethane, propane and heavier 
hydrocarbons. The heating value is affected by the relative amounts of heavier components. 
More of these, results in higher HHV and WI.  
 
The options to make the gas from LNG interchangeable include adding of liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG) or insert gases, such as nitrogen (most common) to reduce heating value, at the 
receiving terminal. In addition, some liquefaction plants are looking into LPG injection based 
on long-term agreements, if sufficient quantities, to justify the effort (Durr et al., 2005). 
Though, the cost of doing such measures is relatively low. There will probably never be a 
single industry answer of how to do this, as not all liquefaction plants and receiving terminals 
will have this flexibility built in. Nonetheless, the average WI of LNG produced from 
different parts of the world hardly differ, meaning that receiving LNG from Norway or 
Australia would be almost equivalent (GIIGNL, 2013).  
 
2.11 ABOUT THE SNØHVIT FIELD  
The Snøhvit gas field was discovered in 1984, and is located in the Norwegian Barents Sea 
northwest from Hammerfest. The development of the field was approved 7th
 
of March in 
2002 by the Norwegian Government. Statoil Petroleum AS is the largest owner with a share 
of 36,79% and is also operator of the gas field. Petoro AS, a company owned by the 
Norwegian state and managing the state’s direct financial interest, has a 30% share of the 
field. Other international petroleum companies which have licenses in the field, are Total 
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E&P Norway (18,4%), GDF Suez E&P Norway (12%) and RWE Dea Norway AS (2,81%) 
(Statoil, 2012). At a water depth of 310-340 meters, natural gas is extracted from Snøhvit and 
is sent through a 160-kilometer long pipeline to the liquefaction plant at Melkøya in 
Hammerfest. At the plant the gas goes through the liquefaction process and is prepared for 
shipping with LNGC to the international markets (NPD, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Illustration of the Snøhvit field and Melkøya plant (Offshoreenergytoday, 2014) 
 
The Snøhvit field has estimated reserves of 244 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and is the 
first in Europe to use subsea production platforms (NPD, 2014). The project is installed with a 
carbon dioxide capture and storage facility located 2,6 km beneath the seabed of the Snøhvit 
field, with a 153 km pipeline for reinjection. Storage capacity of this facility is 700 000 tons 
of carbon dioxide annually (Hydrocarbons-technology.com, 2014). The purpose of these 
reinjections is to reduce the CO2-emmisions, and thereby reduce the pollution effects of the 
petroleum activity. The Snøhvit field is the first of its kind, with carbon capture and storage 
installation (NPD, 2014). 
 
There have been some problems at the Melkøya facility causing shutdowns four times, after 
the start-up in September 2007. Statoil has had problems with both the onshore plant cooling 
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system and the reinjection system, but has a robust and long term plan to solve the problems 
(Helgesen, 2013). 
 
The production capacity of the Snøhvit field is very relevant for exporting capacity to the 
market. A capacity of 4,3 MTPA is equivalent to 5,6 billion cubic meters of LNG. With these 
estimates, the consortium needed four 145 000 m
3
 LNG ships to deliver the product to 
receiving terminals in the US and southern Europe. Total investments for these new ships 
were approximately 5.4 million NOK, and it was calculated that 70 cargos of LNG per year 
would be shipped from the Melkøya facility to the international market. These cargoes were 
initially intended for the US East Coast, but Snøhvit’s owners had to improvise because of an 
oversupply of natural gas in the US market. The reality has become that some of the LNG has 
gone to Europe and some to the Asian market (Lee, 2013a). This demonstrates the importance 
of LNG and its flexibility in changing economic environments.  
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3 NATURAL GAS MARKETS 
Shift in the dynamics of the natural gas market is a complex matter. In this chapter we are 
going to explain the various factors affecting the natural gas price and the spot market. We are 
also going to explain how the regional prices emerged and the events behind.  
 
3.1 FACTORS AFFECTING NATURAL GAS PRICES 
Just as other energy commodities, natural gas prices are a function of supply and demand 
(EIA, 2013a). Electricity generated using natural gas is considered to be swing-capacity. This 
means that it is used to stabilize peak demands that the base load does not handle. The base 
load delivers power around-the-clock, i.e. all hours of the day. During hot summers the 
demand for air conditioning is high, in turn, increasing the power sector’s demand for natural 
gas, which can increase prices. In addition, the capacity of gas-fired power plants is reduced 
by impeding the efficiency when the weather is hot (Lapuerta and Moselle, 2001). In cold 
periods residential and commercial end users consume natural gas for heating purposes, which 
places an upward pressure on prices as the demand increases. In other words, the different 
demand sectors for natural gas have their own intra-annual pattern. Even unexpected or severe 
weather, can in short periods intensify the price, because in the short run there are limited 
alternatives for natural gas consumption or production (EIA, 2013a).  
 
The condition of the economy has a major influence on natural gas demand and prices. A 
period with economic growth leads to an increased demand for goods and services from 
commercial and industrial sectors using natural gas. Especially from the industrial sector, 
which is a leading consumer of natural gas, the demand for both plant fuel and feedstock for 
products such as fertilizer and pharmaceuticals leads to increased natural gas demand. 
Recessions or weak economic growth usually have the opposite effect (EIA, 2013a).  
 
Logically, gas suppliers will seek to move LNG cargoes to markets where demand and price 
conditions provide a profitable opportunity to do so. The extent of this physical arbitrage is 
dependent on the correlation of such demand and price variations between the regional 
markets (Hayes, 2007). Flexible routing of LNG cargoes provides an alternative to meet 
demand variability. This means that diversion of LNG cargoes to respond to price increases 
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would also be expected to reduce those price increases. As a result, diverting cargoes would 
likely reduce the non-correlated variation in prices between markets. LNG industry analysts 
have the common perception that LNG arbitrage will bring “the integration” of regional gas 
markets. The hypothesis is that the growth of LNG trade over time will yield inter-regional 
price relationships like oil or other globally traded commodities, with a tight price connection 
to the cost of transport between regions. In other words, the LNG market will become more 
efficient. Even though there has been an increased interregional trade, LNG flows are still just 
creating links between the regional markets, in which there are strong supply and demand 
dynamics (IGU, 2014). 
 
In periods with lesser demand, natural gas is placed in storage and may be used to dampen the 
impact of high demand during cold weather or short-term increase from unexpected events. 
The gas can be held in underground storage fields (although more efficient in terms of 
volume, storage of natural gas in form of LNG is more expensive). There are two kinds of 
storage facilities for natural gas, each with their own purposes: meeting base load and peak 
load demands (NaturalGas.org, 2014a). The base load storages are used to meet the seasonal 
requirements, while peak load storages are insurances against unforeseen supply disruptions. 
Storage levels usually increase from April through October, when demand for natural gas is 
low, and decrease from November through March, when natural gas demand is high (EIA, 
2013a). 
 
The industrial consumers and electricity generation utility fleet can switch between natural 
gas, coal and oil, depending on their respective price. Because of the interrelationship 
between these fuels and their markets, any shift in demand from natural gas to coal or oil 
reduces natural gas prices. Increasing prices of a competing fuel, relative to natural gas prices, 
will result in increased natural gas use, and inevitably an increase in natural gas prices. 
 
Natural gas has had a few eventful situations where the long-term historical level has 
appeared to be abandoned for much higher prices. Extreme weather, wars and changes in 
energy policy has created new and unexpected imbalances between the supply and demand, 
which has led to price movements. This is reflected in the volatility of natural gas prices. 
Natural gas has always exhibited high price volatility (Pilipovic, 2007). The limited number 
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and cost of storage facilities, the regional structure of the gas market (which is yet to be as 
globally developed as the oil market), and its strong relationship with electricity (the most 
volatile commodity) could be some of the explanations.  High historical volatility might imply 
that just anything could happen. In general, understanding this is crucial in risk management 
of natural gas.  
 
3.2 GAS SPOT MARKET 
Since the world market for natural gas is fragmented into different regional markets, it is not 
possible to talk about a world price, in contrast to oil. In North America where the market is 
highly liberalized prices are very competitive, and is extremely respondent to demand and 
supply forces. In contrast, the Russian federation has a clear monopoly with domestic prices 
kept artificially low, while gas is sold in foreign markets at higher prices to cover the loses. In 
western continental Europe, as well as Japan, the prices are highly based on the competition 
with alternative fuels and mostly indexed on oil prices. In the UK the gas marked is 
liberalized and prices are defined by competitive mechanisms. The interconnector between 
Bacton (UK) and Zeebrugge (Belgium) brings a price formula for spot prices to the UK, 
which is closely related to the formula used for calculating the oil price. Natural gas prices in 
the market may be measured at different stages in the supply chain, starting with the wellhead 
price, and will reflect a number of components: 
 Wellhead price (the cost of natural gas itself) 
 Long-distance transportation cost 
 Local distribution cost 
 
The cost of transportation within Western Europe does not increase with distance, but with the 
number of zones crossed between the two end points. This is not the case over a certain 
distances because gas needs to be regularly re-pressurized in dedicated and costly stations. 
The major demand factors are weather and economic activity. Because of the importance of 
the weather factor, natural gas demand is highly seasonal, causing seasonal fluctuations in 
spot prices (Geman, 2005).  
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Figure 3.1: Overview of global spot price benchmarks in July 2013 (Timera Energy, 2013a). 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the high price differences between regional markets, as seen in July 
2013. We will now go in to the four major markets and explain the dynamics behind the price 
differences, and what caused the big difference in price between them. 
 
 
3.3 THE REGIONAL GAS MARKETS 
3.3.1 NORTH AMERICA 
Natural gas has become one of North America’s most important energy resources, especially 
after the shale gas revolution. The development of shale gas technology with horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing has had significant implications for the domestic supply, for 
natural gas prices and for the economy. The gas market is liberalized and operates with spot 
and futures trading, and with low regulations compared to the European market. As of today, 
natural gas prices remain relatively low compared to levels of the 2000-2010 periods. With 
sustained high North American natural gas production levels and modest economic growth 
there has been a stable natural gas supply and demand. In addition to this, there are continued 
high storage levels, which also contribute to regulation and stabilization of the domestic 
market (Thomas, 2013). But what has caused the price to drop as low as 3 USD/mmBtu? In 
order to explain the situation we have to look at the characteristics of the shale gas revolution.  
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Unconventional gas, compared to conventional gas, does not flow freely to the surface, and 
has to be forced up using injection of chemicals and fracking. This type of gas is more 
expensive to produce and require higher natural gas prices in order to break even (Engdahl, 
2013). Further, there are very high decline rates of 65-85% within the first 12 months of 
production on unconventional wells. From the revolution in 1993 Barnett production wells 
grew from a modest 170 wells in 1993 to a little over 17000 wells at the end of 2013 (Reed, 
2013). With high prices and no regulation, investment and development in technology 
continued to grow. This growth of supply and peeking storage volume as a consequence of 
overproduction (especially in the summer) has caused prices to drop down to today´s level 
(Bernman, 2013). 
 
With large scale emergence of shale gas over the last years and no regulation in investments 
and supply, the downward pressure on North American natural gas prices are quite noticeable. 
The low prices, compared to the other markets, means that the US is in a good position to 
become a LNG exporter as they are moving towards energy self-sufficiency. North America 
has however very limited LNG exports capabilities, due to the fact that most of its 
infrastructure still reflects the assumptions of the 2000s; that they would become a major 
LNG importer. In addition, there are debates centered on the hands-off approach that the 
regulations of LNG exports would cause the domestic prices to skyrocket. As a result the 
North American market has been largely isolated from the rest of the world. Trading at the 
transparent Henry Hub for natural gas currently drives pricing, and the price level is around 5 
USD/mmBtu (Platts, 2014). 
 
3.3.2 EUROPE 
Europe as a whole is the world´s largest importing market. However, the European Union 
(EU) is trying to achieve its 20-20-20-target, and as a result there has been a rising share of 
electricity generation from renewable energy sources, rather than fossil fuels, like natural gas. 
The displacement of gas has increased even further as there been a growth of coal and lignite 
usage, thus offsetting the emissions reduction made through renewables. Unfavorable market 
fundamentals have made the running hours of gas-driven power plants record low. 
Nonetheless, due to its low carbon dioxide content, growing supply diversity and the 
flexibility backing up renewables, gas remains an attractive energy option for Europe, says 
Beate Raabe, Secretary General of Eurogas (Eurogas, 2013a).  
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Most of the gas is coming to Europe by pipeline, but LNG supplies have an increasing share. 
In 2012 EU´s major external sources for natural gas were Russia (23%), Norway (19%) and 
Algeria (9%), where the two latter supplied Europe both through pipelines and LNG. Qatar 
delivered 6% of EU’s gas imports, all as LNG (Eurogas, 2013b). The LNG imports into 
Europe decreased from 24% to 18% from 2011 to 2012 due to the strong competition for 
LNG in the global market, especially from Japan after the Fukushima incident.  
 
The European natural gas market has historically been dominated by bilateral long-term 
takeoff trade agreements, which typically span in the 20+ years duration. In order to the get 
projects going, investments must have been made in both the production, transportation and 
the distribution side of the market (Booz and Company et al., 2013). With this type of 
contracts dominating the market, the gas price tends to follow substitute fuels, in this case oil. 
While the spot market is becoming increasingly important, the prevailing gas pricing model in 
Europe reflects oil price movements rather than actual demand and supply patterns. The 
European commission has pushed towards gas market liberalization throughout the past 
decades, but the markets still remains fragmentally defined by national borders and policies. 
Incumbent utility companies dominate these markets, where of which many are state owned 
and come with long-standing bilateral ties to external suppliers. However, as long-term 
contracts move towards the end of their lifetime, more actors in the market are seeing the 
benefit of spot trading. This could lead to a natural gas market that looks more like the US or 
the UK were hub pricing is used. The hub in the UK is called NBP (National Balancing Point) 
and is a virtual pricing and delivery point for ICE natural gas futures. EU’s decision to 
embark towards de-carbonization and reduce greenhouse emissions is another factor that 
could benefit increased usage of natural gas and LNG  
 
Currently projects and trends in European natural gas are to a large extent driven by policy 
choices and regulation, and to a smaller extent by price, at least compared to the US. The 
situation of existing contract structure may be too strong to fully integrate an independent spot 
market. The declining of natural gas production in Europe and spillover from the economic 
crisis in 2008, combined with the shale gas revolution in the US, has caused an increase in 
natural gas prices. A snapshot from imports to Germany shows that long-term contracts 
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trailed at 12 USD/mmBtu, much higher than US price levels of around 5 USD/mmBtu 
(European Commission, 2013).  
 
3.3.3 ASIA 
The Asian market is the fastest-growing gas market worldwide, and Japan is the world´s 
largest importer of LNG. The natural gas market is dominated by long-term contracts, 
typically signed at a substantial premium to US and European hubs. The prices are highly 
indexed to the price of oil. The long-term contracts have been popular in emerging economies 
because of security of supply. In Japan there was a significant increase in LNG import after 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011. By shutting down their nuclear 
reactors they had to increase the LNG import in order to meet their energy consumption. In a 
market with already high LNG import prices, the volume demanded by Japan has caused a 
large negative economic impact and trade deficit for the country. The increase in LNG import 
cost is imposing stress on the Japanese people and energy intensive industries due to high fuel 
costs (Japan. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2013).  
 
In regards to regulation and control, the Japanese government is involved in both upstream 
and downstream through state owned companies. Due to this vertically integrated structure, 
separation of transport and commercial activities is difficult. If we compare the price level in 
the US at around 5 USD/mmBtu with Japan´s at just short of 20 USD/mmBtu, the difference 
is massive (Platts, 2014). The main reasons for this lies in the noticeable events, such as the 
shale gas revolution and the Fukushima incident. Another big reason is the uncompetitive 
energy market that protects local monopolies (Stern, 2013). Japan’s electricity and gas 
companies provide long-term contracts for their consumers, because it is a good business 
model for local monopolies and regulatory structures. The Japanese have an uncompetitive 
national/regional market and their governmental regulations are affecting price deregulation at 
the wholesale level.  
 
With Japan’s energy deficit they are very dependent on LNG imports. The price in this region 
will continue to stay high because of it, but the question is for how long. Three years after the 
incident there less than one third of the country’s nuclear reactors can satisfy the security 
protocols to start up again. Of Japan 54 nuclear plant, only 14 would probably be online 
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somewhere in the future, meaning that Japan will most certainly be dependent on LNG 
imports in the coming years (DN.no, 2014). 
 
3.3.4 SOUTH AMERICA 
The past two decades have brought dramatic swings to the Latin American natural gas and 
electricity integration. Investors and governments are more risk averse as the economic and 
political drivers of cross-border investment and cooperation have evolved. The technological 
developments of shale gas in the US will be extended to Latin America and a renewed 
political momentum for regional economic cooperation and trade extends to the energy sector. 
After the energy integration euphoria of the late 1990´s the economic liberalization faded with 
more protective and less investment-friendly policies in many South American countries. 
Events such as the peso crisis in Argentina and cut-off of natural gas to Chile during the 
2000s caused South Americans to question each other’s supply agreements (Bailey, 2013). 
The result was that the region turned to the global market, and in the latter half of the first 
decade of 2000, Brazil, Argentina and Chile built LNG terminals to meet their growing 
natural gas demands. Because of the shale gas technology there has been a growing potential 
for shale gas in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The region sees more flexible arrangements 
concerning LNG more likely to move forward than major cross-border pipelines. This is 
mostly because of political differences within the region, environmental concerns of shale gas 
and uncertainty around climate policies. Even with a well-developed LNG sector there is still 
an inability for countries to secure natural gas supplies. It is important to remember that these 
countries are developing countries and their growing energy demand is causing high prices for 
natural gas in this region.  
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4 METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this methodology chapter is to provide insight into how and why our study 
was conducted. The foundation for this study is our participation in a Master’s program in 
Energy Management. The program has a strong focus on the oil, gas and energy sector. In this 
context, we chose to look at the value of investing in a LNGC.  
 
Our main problem statement is: “What is the increased value of investing in a ship selling 
LNG on spot instead of a long-term contract for a Norwegian producer?”  Based on our 
knowledge from our Master’s program, we know that historically LNG carriers have been on 
long-term charters for 20-25 years. Recent demand shifts and the increased trade on the spot 
and short-term market led us thereby to further investigation. 
 
In the initial phase of our research process we made a more specific overview of relevant 
literature and knowledge that could help us with the investigation. This part of the process 
consisted of searching up articles and recent publications both online and in compendia, as 
well as find literature available at the university library. This helped us get an outline of how 
the LNG value chain works, and especially trade and shipping of LNG. The main method to 
answer the research question is an investment analysis.  
 
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
As a result of the thesis’ research question we found it appropriate to use a quantitative 
approach. The reason for this was that we wanted to examine if there is an increased 
profitability of using a LNG carrier without long-term sales contract. To be able to investigate 
if and what the value difference of a free destination carrier and a long-term LNGC, we 
created different fictional cases. These cases would then be analyzed separately, and then 
compared to draw any conclusions. Each of the four cases was based on different assumptions 
and a sub research question, which ultimately would help us answer the main research 
question. In the gas market prices play a very important role. We therefore saw it suitable to 
forecast future prices. In addition, to supply the statistical forecast we did a strategic industry 
analysis, which also helped us evaluate whether or not an investment should take place. We 
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will now go through the method used to forecast future prices, and most importantly, the 
investment analysis. 
 
4.2 FORECASTING 
The predictability of an event or quantity depends on many factors, including: 1) the 
understanding of the factors that contribute to it. 2) The amount of data available. 3) Can the 
forecasts affect the “thing” being forecasted? A good forecasting model captures the way in 
which things change, even if the environment is changing. The latter is reasonable, because 
forecasts rarely assume that the environment is unchanging. What can, and normally is 
assumed, is that the way in which the environment is changing will remain in the future. This 
means that a highly volatile market probably will continue to be highly volatile, and that an 
economy that has had booms and busts probably will continue through these as well. The 
intention with a forecasting model is to define how things move, not just where they are.  
 
A forecast will differ widely in their time horizons, factors determining actual outcomes, type 
of data patters, etc. Forecasting can be done with a number of methods, being very simple 
using the most recent observation, or highly complex such as neural nets and econometric 
systems of simultaneous equations. In cases where there is no data to work with, e.g. 
forecasting sales of a new product, judgmental analysis and forecasting is possible. Hence, the 
data available and the predictability of the quantity to be forecasted is the foundation for 
choice of method.  
 
4.2.1 DETERMINING WHAT TO FORECAST AND WHAT DATA TO USE 
If used correctly, forecasting can be a valuable tool when integrated in decision-making 
activities and strategic planning. Depending on the appliance most organizations need short-, 
medium- and long-term forecasts. Decisions about what to forecast should be done in the 
early stages of such a project. It is also necessary to ask which regions, and whether weekly, 
monthly or annual data should be the output. In addition, what forecast horizon will be 
required? Depending on whether it is one month, half a year or ten years different types of 
models will be necessary. Once the kind of forecast needed has been determined, it is 
necessary to collect the data. Generally, there are two ways of collecting data: collecting own 
35 
 
primary data, or use secondary data that has already been collected and stored within 
databases (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). The first gives the benefit of control 
and confidence that the data will match the study objectives. However, it could be time 
consuming and expensive, compared to using already existing secondary data. The 
disadvantage of the latter is that the quality of the data could be unclear. 
 
4.2.2 FORECASTING METHODS 
The methods of forecasting can be divided in to two main groups: qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative forecasting, sometimes called judgmental forecasting, is used when there is no 
data available, or if the data available is not relevant to the forecasts. Quantitative method can 
be applied when numerical information about the past is available and it is reasonable that 
some characteristics of the historical patterns will continue into the future (Hyndman and 
Athanasopoulos, 2012). This approach has a wide range of methods that often are developed 
within specific disciplines for particular uses. The specific methods have their own properties, 
accuracies and costs that should be reflected upon before use. The data used is usually a time 
series (collected at regular time intervals over time) or cross-sectional data (collected at a 
single point of time) (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2012). Qualitative and quantitative 
forecast can be combined, either by merging statistical and judgmental forecasts, or by 
adjusting the statistical forecast using judgment.  
 
Cross-sectional models 
A cross-sectional model is used when the variable to be forecasted exhibits a relationship with 
one or several predictor variables. The purpose of such an analysis is to describe the structure 
of the relationship and use it to forecast values of the forecast variable that have not been 
observed. Any change in the independent variable will affect the system output in a 
predictable way, assuming that the relationship does not change. Examples of this kind of 
modeling are regression models and additive models.  
 
Time series 
When forecasting using time series the aim is to approximate how the sequence of 
observations will persist in the future. Just as regression and additive models, a time series 
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forecast can capture seasonal and/or trend patterns seen in the historical data and replicate it 
for future years (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2012). However, time series forecasting only 
use information on the variable to be forecasted, and does not estimate the factors which 
affect its behavior. Time series models include ARIMA models, exponential smoothing and 
structural models. 
 
Predictor variables in time series forecasting 
Time series forecasting can also include independent variables. Using only these variables, 
the daily natural gas price (NGP) could be described as: 
 
                                                               
 
Yet, there will always be changes in the natural gas price that cannot be explained by the 
predictor variables. The function also includes the term “error”, which allows for random 
variation and the effects of possible relevant variables that are not included. Since natural gas 
price data are in the form of a time series, the forecasting equation could be in the form of: 
 
                                            
 
Here the function is based on different days, and the prediction is only based on past values of 
the variable. Error is also included to account for the random variations not included in the 
model. Dynamic regression models, panel data models or longitudinal models are examples of 
the combination of these two models, and could look like this: 
 
                                                      
 
Explanatory models using independent variables could be very useful because it incorporates 
information about other variables, rather than only the historical values of the variable to be 
forecasted. According to Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2012) there could be several reasons 
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to choose a time series model over an explanatory model. Foremost, the system may not be 
understood completely. Even if it was, it could be very difficult and time consuming to 
measure the relationships that are assumed to control the dependent variable. Secondly, in 
order to forecast the variable of interest it is necessary to know or forecast the different 
predictors, and this could be extremely difficult. Thirdly, the main goal could be to only 
forecast the variable of interest, not to know why it happens. Lastly, a time series model could 
give more precise forecasts than an explanatory or mixed model.  
 
4.2.3 THE BASIC STEPS OF FORECASTING 
Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2012) list five basic steps in the process of forecasting: 
 
Step 1: Problem definition 
Defining the problem is often the most difficult part of forecasting because it requires an 
understanding of the way the forecast is to be used and who is going to use it. In this thesis the 
forecasts will be future natural gas/LNG prices, and will be used as input in a valuation 
analysis. This is the only purpose, meaning that a time series model will be used to forecast. 
To reflect the cases created on the basis of the sub-research questions, the relevant future 
prices are in UK and Japan. To test the sensitivity of the investment analysis we will create 
three different price scenarios. These will be based on the statistical forecast, and judgmental 
forecasting based on a strategic industry analysis.    
 
Step 2: Gathering information 
The information required will be separated into at least two types: (a) statistical data, and (b) 
the accumulated expertise of the people who collected the data and use the forecasts. In the 
strategic industry analysis we collected information type “b”. 
 
A common approach is to use the historical data to determine which pricing model is 
appropriate and to assign parameters for simulating future prices. This assumes that the 
fundamental characteristics of markets are constant over time. It is often challenging to attain 
enough historical data to fit a good statistical model. Yet, very old data will be less useful due 
to changes in the system being forecasted. In our case the availability of historical data was 
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somewhat limited. Although the data was more than sufficient in terms of the years going 
back, only monthly averages was publically available. The source of the historical prices was 
the Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities (The World Bank, 2014). The prices in 
Japan are monthly average estimates based on the LNG import Cost Insurance and Freight 
(CIF). The price in Europe is based on average import border prices. However, a spot price 
component from NBP was only included from April 2010. The lack of more specific data 
makes this a simplified representation of the European market, as it is consists of many more 
pricing points or hubs. Nonetheless, this generalization makes it possible to compare this 
regional market to other regional markets, i.e. Japan, where the pricing data also is based on 
an average. For simplification, the future prices for Europe will represent the local price at the 
delivery point defined in Case 2. Similarly, the future price in Japan will also represent the 
local price at the defined delivery point defined in Case 3. Case 4 will use a combination of 
these future prices. 
 
The natural gas price time series show some major disturbances in the recent years. The 
increased growth of LNG imports and major changes to market conditions suggests that very 
old data may not provide a reliable predictor for future price behavior. This is visible from the 
major price movements for all three regional markets illustrated in Figure 6.1. Prior to the 
1990’s natural gas prices moved very fragmented, and was highly reflected by the use of 
pipelines and no flexibility. Since the year 2000, LNG as a natural gas source has been 
growing steadily (IGU, 2014).  To account for these changes, while using the greatest number 
of observations, the natural gas price data starts in year 2000 until the most recent 
observation, April 2014.  
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Figure 4.1: Natural gas prices, USD/mmBtu over the period of January 2000 to February 2014 
(The World Bank, 2014)  
 
In accordance with the data series available, it is assumed that the choice of the market for 
LNG shipments is updated on a monthly basis. Although this might be a simplifying 
assumption, as it removes a lot of the variance and could be misleading, it is not unreasonable 
because it provides a lower bound (between daily and monthly data series) for the value of 
destination flexibility. Since it takes some time to schedule a LNG shipment (both laden and 
ballast - a round trip from Norway to Japan takes over 40 days), it is very difficult to profit 
from very short-term arbitrage opportunities such as daily or weekly price data. Using 
monthly price movements could enable capturing of seasonal effects of the markets. The 
share of spot trade in the LNG market is not significant, but increasing. This leads us to the 
possibility of seasonal market switching between the European and Japan market. In addition, 
there could be a possibility to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities on a monthly basis.  
 
The US market is fairly close to the Central and Southern American, where the price is 
significantly higher. However, the possibility of arbitrage from buying LNG in the US and 
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selling to these or other markets is not considered. The reason for this is the US energy policy 
keeping exports low and thereby maintaining low energy prices domestically. Therefore, the 
US market as an alternative, has not been used in any of the cases. In addition, this thesis is 
limited to the standpoint of a Norwegian producer’s. Lastly, to refine our focus further the 
South American market is not included in any of the cases.  
 
Step 3: Preliminary (exploratory) analysis 
This step involves presenting the data in an informative way, e.g. graphics. Further, analyze 
the data by looking for consistent patterns, seasonality, business cycles, and outliers. The tool 
used for this step was R, a software environment for statistical computing and graphics. R was 
also used for fitting a model and forecasting future prices. A lot of the time used in the 
preliminary analysis was used to explore and learn the computing language and the functions 
of the program.  
 
For the price scenarios based on judgmental forecasting, the preliminary analysis was 
combined with a strategic analysis. This strategic analysis was used as a foundation to argue 
whether or not an investment in the LNG industry is valuable.  
 
Step 4: Choosing and fitting model 
The higher number of observations, the greater chance we have of getting a reliable forecast. 
However, using merely 13 years of monthly data to forecast future prices in the lifetime of a 
LNG carrier could in many ways be considered a wild guess. The thing being forecasted is 
unknown, or it would not be necessary to forecast it, and could be regarded as a random 
variable. The future monthly natural gas price could take a range of possible values, and until 
the month is over and an average is estimated, the value is unknown.  Because the next month 
is relatively close it is possible to give a reasonable forecast estimate. In most situations the 
variation associated with the variable will shrink as the event approaches.  This means that the 
further into the future a variable is to be forecasted, the more uncertainty it will have. Given 
the data we had available, and the flexibility of fitting it, we chose to use an ARIMA model 
for each of the two time series.   
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Step 5: Applying and evaluating a forecasting model 
After estimating model parameters, the model can be used to make forecasts. A forecast will 
always only be an estimate, with increasingly broader prediction intervals. The forecast itself 
will be the middle of the range of possible values the random variable could take. In most 
cases, a forecast is accompanied with a prediction interval giving the range of values the 
random variable could take with relatively high probability. For example, the 95% prediction 
interval will contain the range of values, which should include the actual future value with 
95% probability.  
 
The evaluations of the forecasting models were based on the assumptions taken when fitting 
them. Mainly this involved analyzing the residuals, i.e. the error not explained by the model. 
How an ARIMA model is estimated will be explained in the following sections.  
 
4.2.4 FORECASTING TOOLS 
Autoregressive model 
The term autoregression indicates that it is a regression of the variable against itself. With an 
autoregression model we can forecast the variable of interest using linear combination of past 
values of the variable. Accordingly, an autoregressive model of order p can be written as: 
 
                                
 
Where   is a constant and    is white noise. The autoregression is almost like a multiple 
regression, but with lagged values of    as predictors, and is referred to as an AR(p) model. 
The benefit of Autoregression models is that they are flexible at handling a wide range of 
different time series patterns.  
 
Changing the parameters        result in different time series patterns. The variance of the 
error term    will however only change the scale of the series, not the patterns (Hyndman and 
Athanasopoulos, 2012). 
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For the AR(1) model it is important to remember that: 
 When    ,    is equivalent to white noise 
 When      and    ,    is equivalent to a random walk 
 When      and    ,    is equivalent to a random walk with drift 
 When    ,    tends to oscillate between positive and negative values 
 
Some constraints on the values of the parameters are required since autoregressive models are 
normally restricted to stationary data:  
 For an AR(1) model:           
 For an AR(2) model:          ,        ,          . 
 
If     the restrictions are much more complicated. R takes care of these restrictions when 
estimating a model. 
 
Moving average models 
A moving average model uses past forecast errors in a regression-like model, rather than use 
past values of the forecast variables in a regression. This model is referred to as an MA(q) 
model, where    is the white noise and, are used for forecasting future values.  
 
                               
 
The values of    is not observed, so it is not really regression in the usual sense. Although 
each value of    can be thought of as a weighted moving average of the past few forecast 
errors, it should not be confused with moving average smoothing. Moving average models are 
used for forecasting future values, while moving average smoothing are used for estimating 
trend cycles of past values (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2012). 
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Changing the parameters        result in different time series patterns. Just as with 
autoregression models, the variance of the error term   will only change the scale, not the 
patterns.  
 
There is a possibility of writing any AR(p) model as an MA(∞) model. We can demonstrate 
this for an AR(1) model, using repeated substitution as an example: 
 
                     
                       
    
                
    
        
                
      
 
Given that       , the value of   
  will get smaller as   gets larger. So eventually we 
obtain an MA(∞) process: 
 
                      
          
            
 
If we impose some constraints on the MA parameters, the reverse result holds and the MA 
model is invertible. Then we can write any invertible MA(q) process as an AR(∞) process. 
Invertible models are not simply for enabling us to convert MA to AR models. Some of their 
mathematical properties also make them easier to use in practice.  
 
Invertible constraints are similar to the stationary constraints. 
 
 For an MA(1) model:            . 
 For an MA(2) model:                                          
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ARIMA models  
ARIMA models can be used with both non-seasonal and seasonal data. To obtain an ARIMA 
model (non-seasonal), we combine the differencing with autoregression and a moving average 
model. ARIMA stands for Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average model (integration in 
this context is the reverse of differencing). This model can be written as: 
 
  
          
          
                     
 
In this model   
  is the differenced series, and it may have been differenced more than once. 
The predictors on the RHS include both lagged values of    and lagged errors. This is called 
an ARIMA(p,d,q) model, where: 
 
p = autoregressive order 
d = degree of first differencing involved 
q = moving average order 
 
The stationarity and invertibility conditions used for autoregressive and moving average 
models, also apply to this ARIMA model.  
 
When we combine the components we can form a more complicated model, which is much 
easier to work with the backshift notation. Then the equation can be written as: 
 
            
                                 
     
   ↑           ↑                ↑ 
AR(p)      differences           MA(q) 
            
It is usually not possible to tell the order of the ARIMA model simply by looking at a time 
plot. Tools like ACF and PACF plots can be helpful to select the appropriate values for p, d 
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and q. In addition, the function auto.arima() in R does this automatically. However, in most 
cases the best solution is to combine the two, and then check some variations of the model/s 
suggested by ACF/PACF plots and the auto.arima()-function (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 
2012). 
 
A seasonal ARIMA model includes additional seasonal terms in the non-seasonal ARIMA 
model. It can be written as follows: 
 
                      
 
Where          is the additional seasonal part, and  is the number of periods per season. 
The seasonal part use AR and MA terms to predict     using data values and errors at times 
with lags that are multiplied with     
 
White noise 
Time series showing non-autocorrelation are called white noise. White noise refers to serially 
uncorrelated random variables with zero mean and finite variance. White noise ACF spikes 
are expected to lie within 95% significance bounds. These bounds are common to plot. If 
there are one or several large spikes outside these bounds the series is not likely white noise. 
   
Autocorrelation 
In the same way correlation measures the scope of a linear relationship between two variables, 
autocorrelation measures the linear relationship between lagged values of a time series 
(Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2012).  The different coefficients of autocorrelation depend 
on the lag length, e.g.    measures the relationship between    and     . The value of    can 
be written as: 
 
    
∑                  
 
     
∑          
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Where   is the length of the time series.  
 
Plots of the autocorrelation coefficients form the autocorrelation function (ACF), this is also 
known as a correlogram.   
 
Partial autocorrelation 
If    and      are correlated, then      and      are also correlated. It would then seem like 
   and      are correlated in some way, just because they are both connected to     . To 
measure this relationship between    and      after removing the effects of other time lags: 
             we can use the partial autocorrelations. The plot of these partial 
autocorrelations is called PACF. The first part partial autocorrelation is identical to the first 
autocorrelation, simply because there is nothing between them to remove. The partial 
autocorrelations for the following lags can be calculated as: 
 
                                           
                                                          
 
                               
 
Changing the number of terms on the RHS of this autoregression model gives    for different 
values of  .  
 
Portmanteau tests for autocorrelation 
The Ljung-Box statistic was proposed by Ljung and Box (1978). It is also known as a 
modified Box-Pierce statistic, and is a function of the accumulated sample 
autocorrelations,   , up to any specific time lag of h. As a function of h, we get the following 
formula: 
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            ∑
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
where   is the length of the time series.  
 
This statistic can be used to examine residuals from a time series model to see if all the 
underlying population autocorrelations for the errors may be 0. For nearly all models, which 
we consider, the residuals are assumed to be white noise, implying that they are identically, 
independently distributed from each other. This means that the ideal ACF for residuals is that 
all autocorrelations are 0. Further this implies that      should be 0 for any lag of  . With a 
significant      for residuals, indicates that it may be a possible problem with the model.  
 
Two cases of      distribution: 
1. When    are sample autocorrelations for residuals in a time series model, the null 
hypothesis distribution of      is approximately a    distribution with df = h – p, 
where p = the number of coefficients in the model.  
2. When no model is implemented, so that the ACF is for raw data, p = 0 and the null 
distribution of      is approximately a    distribution with df = h. 
 
A p-value, in both cases, is calculated as the probability past      in the relevant distribution. 
A small p-value indicates the possibility of non-zero autocorrelation within the first   lags. In 
other words, a large p-value is not evidence of independence, simply a lack of evidence of 
independence.    
 
To ensure that the number of lags is large enough to capture any meaningful and troublesome 
correlations, Hyndman’s (2014a) rule of thumb is used: 
     For non-seasonal time series, use                
     For seasonal time series, use              . 
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Power transformations 
Heteroskedasticity can be a problem when fitting an ARIMA model to a time series. Such 
non-stationarity in variance, even after differencing, can be removed by transformations. Box-
Cox transformations are a family of transformations that includes logarithms and power 
transformations (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2012).  The original observations are 
denoted as         and the transformed observations as       , then           . A 
useful feature of logarithmic transformations is that they constrain forecasts to stay positive.  
Examples of power transformations are square roots and cube roots, and can be written as 
     
    Which transformation to use in the Box-Cox family depends on the parameter λ, 
and are defined as follows: 
    {
             
  
   
 
       
 
Back-transformation 
The reverse back-transformation is given by: 
 
    {
             
       
          
 
 
Transformations usually make little difference to the forecasts, but have a large effect on the 
prediction intervals. The approach preserves the probability coverage, although it will no 
longer be symmetric around the point forecast. 
 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
AIC is a useful model selection tool, based on a penalized likelihood. Hence, it requires the 
likelihood to be maximized before it can be calculated. It can be defined as:  
 
        (
   
 
)         
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Where  is the number of observations used for the estimation and   is the number of 
predictors in the model. The model that gives the lowest value of AIC is usually the best 
model for forecasting. However, AIC from, for example an ARIMA model and an ETS 
model, cannot be compared (Hyndman, 2014a). 
 
Corrected Akaike’s Information Criterion (AICc) 
AICc is a bias-corrected version of the AIC, as the AIC tends to select too many predictors 
when   is small. AICc should also be minimized. 
 
         (
   
 
)   
           
     
 
 
4.3 INVESTMENT ANALYSIS TOOLS 
In order to evaluate whether an investment should be take place or not, valuation tools are 
necessary. Choosing the right valuation tools is an important part of financial decision 
making. An investment holds factors that are uncertain, which may include prices, demand, 
costs, technology and other known and unknown factors. In order to cope with these factors 
we manage the risks involved in the investment with measurable valuation tools. 
 
In the investment analysis we had taken into account prices forecasted, presented in three 
different scenarios, and costs relevant from similar shipping operations.  
 
4.3.1 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW VALUATION  
Discounted cash flow (DCF) is used in capital budgeting to analyze the profitability of an 
investment or project (Brennan and Schwartz, 1986). DCF-analysis can be divided into two 
main categories, the net present value method (NPV) and the internal rate of return method 
(IRR). The two methods have many similarities, but also some differences.   
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NPV 
The aim of profit maximizing companies is to take on investments with positive net present 
value (NPV) to create shareholder value. It involves a comparison between the costs of the 
project, and the present value of the cash flows generated by the project, which is calculated 
according to this formula: 
 
           ∑
   
      
 
   
 
 
In this model     is the cash flow expected in the period and      
  is the appropriate 
discount rate in the period. To calculate expected NPV, future cash flows must be forecasted. 
In addition, we have a third factor in the NPV formula,    , which is the initial investment 
value of the project. The output of the equation is an NPV figure, telling decision makers 
what the project is worth at the date of the analysis. Projects with a positive NPV generates 
more money than they cost and should be undertaken, while projects with a negative NPV 
generate less money than they cost and should obviously not be undertaken from a financial 
point of view. Even though a project generates a positive NPV, companies should be careful 
with investments that have high CAPEX and OPEX and only marginally positive NPVs. 
 
WACC 
When determining discount rates, many companies start with the company cost of capital, 
which is a calculation of a company’s cost of capital where each category of capital is 
proportionately weighted. This measure is called the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC).  If a project is considered to be equally as risky as the company’s existing business, 
the cash flow projects may be discounted by WACC, and is calculated with this formula: 
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In this model       is interest rate the company pays for their debt. The two fractions in the 
formula represent debt and equity ratios. The last part of the formula is        , which is the 
cost of equity.  
 
In order to calculate the cost of equity many companies use the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). When investing in new projects the companies need to consider two types of risk, 
unsystematic and systematic risk. Unsystematic risk represents company or industry specific 
risk, and can be removed by diversifying investments in different markets, creating a 
diversified portfolio (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2011). Systematic risk is associated with risks 
that affect the entire economy, such as wars, recessions and disasters. This type of risk cannot 
be avoided through diversification. CAPM is a model, which describes the relationship 
between risk and expected return of the investment, and is calculated through the following 
formula: 
 
                     (           ) 
 
In this formula    is the risk free interest rate and is the rate received from investing in 
securities considered to have no credit risk. Examples of this are government bonds and bank 
deposits.         represents the compensations that the market demands for owning the asset 
and bearing the risk of that ownership. The systematic risk is represented through        , and 
is a measure of the volatility of the company’s share, compared to the market as a whole. If 
the beta is above or below one, the shares of the company move more or less than the market 
(Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2011). The last part of the formula is (           ), and 
represents the market risk premium. This figure is the difference between the expected return 
on a market portfolio and the risk-free rate.  
 
IRR 
An IRR analysis output is the projects IRR, and is defined as the discount rate, which makes 
NPV equal to 0. In general, the higher a projects IRR, the more desirable it is to undertake the 
project. Finding a project IRR can be done through this formula: 
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Pros of DCF-analysis 
The DCF-analysis is well known in financial theory with many applications, especially in 
valuation. It contributes to the decision making process, by providing a systematic and logic 
framework for an investment. The analysis takes costs, revenues, the issue of time and risk 
into its valuation. It does not only encourage investors to analyze all the relevant factors, but 
also to realize the importance of each factor and possible outcomes of different factors and 
scenarios.  
 
Cons of DCF-analysis 
The DCF-analysis often ignores how inflation will affect the various cash flows in the project. 
A proper analysis requires an understanding of inflation adjustment patterns for different cash 
flow segments (Hodder and Riggs, 1985). By not including inflation in an analysis, 
undervaluation of future cash flows may occur, resulting in not undertaking profitable 
projects. With positive inflation rate, the gap between projected cash flows and their nominal 
value grows over time. In oil and gas projects, price development, OPEX, CAPEX and other 
factors are subjected to inflation, so it would be a lack of consistency if future cash flows 
were not adjusted for inflation. Real cash flows should be discounted at a real rate, and can be 
calculated through this formula: 
 
       
            
             
   
 
The DCF-analysis and its failure to acknowledge how project risk can be reduced by 
diversification, is an issue when looking at isolated projects (Hodder and Riggs, 1985). By not 
diversifying a portfolio the expected return is higher for an investor because of the higher risk 
associated with it. Financial theory weighs the importance of a projects total risk, consisting 
of unsystematic and systematic risks, which are respectively diversifiable and non-
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diversifiable. A project diversified in different segments of the market may seem less risky 
than an isolated project’s DCF-valuation. By looking at isolated projects the analysis may 
only evaluate the factors concerning the project. If these factors are evaluated using strategic 
reasoning the valuation becomes much more robust.  
 
This drawback of the DCF-analysis has contributed to the development of the real option 
valuation, where the decision maker has the right but not the obligation to buy or sell an asset. 
In this thesis we are researching the increased value of a using an LNG carrier on free 
destination, and not the option of investing or not. Weather the investment takes place or not 
is irrelevant, since we are only interested in the value. Hence, the DCF method is used to 
evaluate the investment. 
 
4.4 RELIABILITY 
The reliability of the data obtained is affected by the collector’s ability to understand and 
present it properly, and the ultimate goal is to reduce errors and bias in the study. 
(Johannessen, Christoffersen & Tufte, 2011).  The purpose of checking for reliability is to 
make sure that other researchers will produce the same results if this research is repeated later 
on. As this is mainly a quantitative study it would not be complicated to generate the same 
results. However, a requirement for this is that the same methodology and assumptions are 
used. By using quantitative measures like IRR and NPV we have two assessment tools that 
can measure value, and thereby increasing the reliability of this study. Although these 
measures are very objective, the assumptions used are somewhat subjective. For example, the 
method for determining the cost of equity is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which 
parameters cannot be estimated precisely. Firstly, one would have to define a market index, 
and even if the beta is estimated from a regression, it would be based on subjective inputs, e.g. 
time series length, and whether to use daily, monthly, quarterly, etc. data. Secondly, there 
could be some changes to the firm during the estimation period. If later investigators change 
some of the basic inputs like fuel consumption, loading and discharging ports, fuel type, and 
other voyage specific costs, the output will not match the findings of this thesis. Hence, if a 
similar study uses the same methods and data it would most likely reproduce the results.  
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4.5 VALIDITY 
Even though reliability is important in a study, it also needs to be valid. The validity of a 
research can be divided into internal and external validity (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2012). The internal validity of this research is the extent of which the findings 
provide an accurate representation of the thing to be described. The use of quantitative 
method and a systematic approach to the analyses makes us confident that the results are true 
and that the conclusions are correct. The interpretation of value under certainty is fairly easy. 
However, when there is uncertainty the interpretation is more problematic. It is expected that 
the value of spot and forward trade is highly affected by the market price. Therefore, using the 
appropriate data to forecast prices is of high importance. We chose monthly averages of 
European and Japanese prices. Even though the future prices estimated from our Europe data 
could be considered as a representation of Europe as a whole, the shipping distances in 
Europe is highly voyage specific. In addition, we have no way of knowing how these averages 
were estimated, and its weighting. As a consequence we decided to shorten the European 
natural gas prices, making it start in April 2010, when NBP spot prices were included. We 
believe that this smaller sample represents the natural gas price characteristics after the 
financial crisis and increased spot trade. The precision weakened and bias reduced, making 
the forecast more imprecisely right. Maybe if we had been able to get monthly averages from 
a specific delivery point or hub the accuracy of the forecast and the valuation analysis would 
have increased somewhat, while keeping bias low. Still, these forecasts were combined with 
judgmental analysis of the LNG industry to create three different price scenarios. By applying 
these price scenarios we can with a higher degree of certainty determine the value of the 
investment, given certain prices.  
 
The external validity of this research is whether the results we have reached can be 
generalized to other settings. The LNG market is considered a bullish energy market, and the 
characteristics of such a market are probably not found in other energy markets. Therefore, it 
is not likely that such a value differentiation would occur in for example the oil market.  
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5 PRESENTATION OF THE CASES 
Here we will present the cases used in the investment analysis. Every case will have its 
delivery point from the Melkøya plant in Hammerfest.   
 
5.1 CASE 1 – FORWARD CONTRACT TO MILFORD HAVEN, UK 
As mentioned earlier, the LNG from the Snøhvit field was originally intended towards the US 
East Cost. However, the shale gas revolution made it unprofitable to ship LNG to the US. 
95% of Norway’s natural gas infrastructure is tied up in pipelines to the North Western 
Europe, which makes Norway highly exposed towards market risk (Halmø, 2013). Long-term 
contracts have historically been a necessity to develop costly infrastructure. Today, around 
70% of the total LNG sales are based on long-term contracts. To reflect this, the first case will 
consist of 100% risk management control through a forward contract with a buyer located at 
Milford Haven in the UK.  
 
A forward contract gives the owner the right and the obligation to buy a specified asset 
on a specified date at a specified price. The seller of the contract has the right and the 
obligation to sell the asset on the date for that specified price (Miller and Dubofsky, 
2003). 
 
As described above, a forward contract provides the opportunity to purchase a specific 
quantity at agreed price, with delivery in the future. The price of a forward contract is set so 
that the value is basically the same for both parties. Whether or not the contract turns out to be 
profitable for one of the parties depends on how the market fluctuates. If 100% available 
transportation offered by the new LNGC is tied up to a UK buyer, then there is no possibility 
of export towards other regional markets unless the contract is broken.  
 
5.2 CASE 2 – SPOT SALES TO MILFORD HAVEN, UK 
Every commodity is traded on a spot market. The transaction of a commodity may be 
physical, with delivery of the commodity, or financial, with a cash flow from one party to 
another at maturity with no exchange of underlying good. Physical and financial commodities 
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are, as one may expect, strongly related (Geman, 2005). In order to isolate the economic value 
of selling towards an alternative market, we have a second case, where sales are 100% spot to 
buyers located at Milford Haven, UK.   
 
5.3 CASE 3 – SPOT SALES TO YOKOHAMA, JAPAN 
In terms of potential price, the Japanese market is the most interesting market from a 
Norwegian supplier’s point of view. To investigate the possibility of achieving the highest 
possible price, Case 3 is 100% spot sales to Japan. The buyers will be located in the port of 
Yokohama. In this third case there are two alternative transport routes. The first option is 
going through the Suez Canal, whereas the second is shipment via the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR).  
 
The Northern Sea Route 
The NSR is an international transit route that opened up for commercial transit in 2009. The 
route starts at the Novaya Zemlya Island in the West and ends at the Bering Strait in east, and 
introduces the possibility of quicker shipments through the new connection between Europe 
in the west, to Asia in the east. The reason for using the NSR as an alternative in the third case 
is the potential costs and time saved, compared to the traditional route through the Suez 
Canal. The Centre for High North Logistics (Gunnarsson, 2013) did a cost saving analysis 
with a round trip from Melkøya in Norway to Yokohama in Japan. The research showed that 
the cost saved from this trip was 6 854 000 USD, and time saved was almost 43 days. The 
availability of the NSR is not year round, due to winter and summer season changes. When 
the route is open, during the five months from July to November, it will be used in the 
Japanese spot case (Jones, 2013). 
 
5.4 CASE 4 – SPOT SALES TO BOTH UK AND JAPAN 
This fourth case will combine spot sales to both Milford Haven in UK and Yokohama in 
Japan. During the summer months the NSR will be used to sell LNG in Japan, while the rest 
of the year sales will be to UK. In that way we can investigate in the case comparisons if the 
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Japanese market really is that attractive. In addition, this would serve as a third option selling 
LNG on spot, as defined in the main research question.    
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6 STRATEGIC INDUSTRY ANALYSIS  
In order to make proper investment decisions we have made an external and internal analysis 
of the barriers in the LNG sector using the PESTEL framework for external analysis and 
Porter’s five forces for the internal analysis. 
 
6.1 PESTEL 
The first framework in this strategic analysis is at a macro level, and helps us assess the 
external environment of the LNG industry. A PESTEL analysis describes the macro-
environmental factors and how it can impact the development of the industry and how it 
ultimately is influencing the value of the companies operating within it. By understanding the 
political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors, one can better 
make strategic decisions in business environments with external influence (Murray-Vebster, 
2010). With this analysis we are going to take a look at the pros and cons of the LNG macro-
environment from a Norwegian point of view. We are excluding social and legal from the 
analysis because of their lack of impact and because they are approximately similarly for all 
companies operating in the industry.  
 
6.1.1 POLITICAL 
There has been a reduced demand for natural gas from the OECD-Europe during the last year 
(EIA, 2013b). If this continues, along with an unclear long-term energy policy in Europe, it 
could cause a reduction in the willingness to invest in gas production and infrastructure, 
according to senior advisor Ottar Skagen in Statoil (Tollaksen, 2013). 
 
Analytics are predicting a long-term higher self-sufficiency of renewable energy in Europe 
after Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis, because of reduced confidence in Russia as a 
credible natural gas supplier. There are predictions about higher shale gas focus, causing 
lower natural gas prices in Europe in the long run. Even though Russia is as dependent on 
income from export as their customers are on natural gas, they have threatened with sanctions. 
(Tollaksen, 2013). This crisis however, puts Norway in a good perspective since they become 
more attractive as a stabile supplier of natural gas. Another key issue to keep in mind is that 
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when Russia continually uses natural gas as a political weapon it reduces the reputation of 
gas, which is more serious in the long run.  
 
Since natural gas consumption in Europe has gone down the last two years, this type of 
energy might be too unstable for the energy security in many European countries. There is a 
common understanding in political Europe to go for more renewable energy; it might reduce 
natural gas consumption as a major in the energy mix.   
 
6.1.2 ECONOMICAL  
The Shale gas revolution has caused a drop in coal in the US, causing them to have an 
oversupply of coal, which they can sell cheaper to Europe. This entails a reduced 
consumption of natural gas in Europe with prices falling somewhat. Norway has tied 95% of 
their natural gas infrastructure to Europe, and is highly exposed to price volatility in the 
European market. With only 5% LNG available to export, Norwegian natural gas is very 
dependent on the European market. If this trend continues Norway could miss out on huge 
monetary values (Tollaksen, 2013). With reduced income from natural gas exports to Europe, 
Norway has to reconsider their co-dependence on Europe as a supplier. This is a selling point 
for investment in LNG, by increasing the flexibility and diversification it could reduce 
Norwegian market exposure. There are big opportunities in the Asian market post-Fukushima, 
and by giving more attention to the Asian market, Norway would as a supplier put more 
pressure on Europe making it a sellers’ market. The NSR has become more available due to 
global warming, and this has opened up for possibilities for Norwegian supply towards Asia. 
The NSR offers as an alternative to going through the Suez Canal, and could mean potential 
savings of up to 7 million USD and 40 days for a round trip (Gunnarsson, 2013). 
 
In Europe there is a LNG receiving capacity of less than 150 MTPA (IGU, 2014).  According 
to Gas Infrastructure Europe (2014) there are 7 receiving terminals (27 MTPA) under 
construction and another 25 terminals (>120 MTPA) planned in the coming years. This 
demonstrates the further commitment towards LNG by Europe. 
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6.1.3 TECHNOLOGICAL 
With increased interest in LNG, the technology race becomes an advantage for LNG 
operations. Technological improvements in all parts of the value chain are increasing the 
utilization of natural gas and making it more efficient and profitable.  
 
The Fukushima incident has reduced confidence in nuclear energy technology, and has 
resulted in the out-phasing of nuclear power in Germany. This is beneficial for natural gas, as 
it has caused a higher demand, and thus, higher prices.  
 
6.1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL 
Global warming has led to an increased attention towards reducing CO2 emissions. The 
closest alternative energy source to natural gas is coal and oil. Both of those options lead to 
more pollution than natural gas (NaturalGas.org, 2014b). Therefore, natural gas is considered 
to be the best option compared to coal and oil. Political instruments and/or regulations may be 
used to turn the energy mix more towards more environmental friendly alternatives. However, 
coal-producing nations such as Poland are working against the EU and their goal to improve 
climate towards 2020. Meanwhile, carbon offsets decreased from 250 NOK to 60 NOK per 
ton CO2 in 2012 (Tollaksen, 2013). As a result, the addition of cheap US coal in Europe has 
made natural gas demand suffer. 
 
Global shipping industry has in recent years faced increasing limitations to sulfur emissions, 
thereby presenting LNG as a viable alternative maritime fuel. It contains close to none sulfur 
and its combustion produces low NOx (mono-nitrogen oxides) compared to fuel oil and 
marine diesel oil (Gastechnology.org, 2014). It also has economic advantages. Even with high 
Asian LNG prices, it is still lower than global bunker fuel prices.  
 
Higher LNG consumptions also offer environmental difficulties. Transportation of LNG is 
significantly more polluting than pipelines, because of the extra energy needed to liquefy and 
transport. As policymakers try to balance the promotion of energy security and the EU target 
of 20% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2020, this could become a barrier for LNG in 
Europe. 
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6.2 PORTER’S FIVE FORCES – INTERNAL ANALYSIS 
The natural gas supply market is very complex, and in order to make good investment 
decision it is necessary to examine the basic competitive structure of the natural gas industry 
through the competitive forces around a Norwegian perspective. Before an investment in any 
industry, it’s important to understand what forces determine the profits. For this purpose we 
decided to use porter’s industry analysis framework. The model focuses on how five forces in 
an industry (competitive rivalry, suppliers, buyers, new entrants and substitutes) impacts and 
limits the profitability of the sector (Ahlstrom, and Bruton, 2010).   
  
6.2.1 COMPETITIVE RIVALRY AND SUPPLY POWER 
The reason for putting competitive rivalry and supply power in the same section is because we 
are looking at countries as a whole, both with focus on their supply capabilities and their 
competitive advantage/disadvantage in the LNG world market. Since the market is high in 
demand and prices, the competitiveness of the region depends on their ability to supply LNG. 
 
North America 
The reason for the low price for natural gas in domestic North America is as mentioned in 
3.3.1, the shale gas revolution. With low prices domestic and high prices in other regional 
markets, especially Japan, LNG supply companies in the US have put pressure on the Obama 
administration to approve export of LNG to exploit regional price differences. But large 
inland users of natural gas, such as the petrochemical industry, are worried that exports could 
drive domestic prices up. A higher export rate and domestic use, compared to supply rate, 
could cause a supply deficit in the US, pushing prices up. There has been cases were the price 
for natural gas in the US has increased from 2 USD/mmBtu, breaking the 5 USD/mmBtu 
mark earlier this year, which has not happened since 2010 (Platts, 2014) Some analysts are 
blaming the cold weather, but according to natural gas analyst Bill Powers this has to do with 
fundamental changes in the US natural gas scene (Business News Network, 2014). As 
consequence of the oversupply from the shale gas revolution, low margins led to a decline in 
production rates and reduced drilling start-ups. Bill Powers further augmented that this could 
lead to another price incline, where the price could go up to 7 USD/mmBtu in the coming 
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winter of 2014/2015 (Business News Network, 2014). This, combined with their currently 
limited LNG export capacity, limits and isolates the US market somewhat from the rest of the 
world in the short term.  
 
Another key factor for US export of LNG is the cost of transportation, especially from the US 
Gulf Coast. However, there is optimism as the Panama Canal expansion project is 
approaching completion. This would mean a significant reduced sea voyage going from the 
US Gulf to Japan, from approximately 16 000 nm to about 9 500 nm going around Cape of 
Good Hope (Miles and Holmberg, 2014). 
 
As of today the U.S. Department of Energy are only issuing export authorizations case by 
case. An important element is that the infrastructure still reflects the assumptions that the US 
were to become be a major LNG importer. The US invested billions of dollars making LNG 
import terminals, which also came with high political and environmental debate. If the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the U.S Department of Energy issues a green 
light for export across the country and allows licenses to transform the import terminals to 
export terminals the US could be a major supplier of LNG in the long term (Ebinger, 2014). 
 
Russia 
As production and export initiatives intensify in North America, Russia is moving towards 
strengthening their position as a natural gas exporter. In a response to the changing dynamics 
in the LNG market, President Vladimir Putin has also authorized LNG export licenses to other 
companies than Gazprom. The liberalization is a strategy designed to double Russian LNG 
market share in the long run. In addition to wanting a bigger part of the Asian market, Russia 
is exporting LNG to Spain also. Russia has a long relationship with Europe as a natural gas 
supplier through pipelines, and is entering the LNG race to secure a flexible position as a 
supplier. Gazprom is currently the world’s leading natural gas producer and operator of the 
LNG plant on the Sakhalin Island close to Japan. The company is also considering a new 
LNG plant in the Baltics to further target the European market. Russia is on both short and 
long-term outlook a big competitor in the natural gas market (Miles and Holmberg, 2014). 
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Australia 
Australia is a well-positioned LNG producer to take advantage of vast natural gas reserves, as 
well as their relative proximity to the Asian market. This could make Australia a major actor 
in the LNG supply race in a long-term perspective. However, with relatively high production 
costs compared to other actors they could be outcompeted. These high production cost have 
been driven by Australian dollar appreciation, higher labour expenses and weather delays. In 
the short term, these production costs can cause Australia to become less competitive in the 
LNG industry.  
 
Africa 
Africa is one of the first LNG export regions, and is experiencing a period of intense growth 
in their export capabilities. The region once supplied LNG to North America and is now 
developing new export projects alongside its former customer. A 53-day maintenance period 
at an Angolan LNG export plant affected the spot market prices in Asia, which illustrates the 
importance and sizable share of the African LNG (Miles and Holmberg, 2014). As Russia, 
Africa is a big actor in the LNG supply market on both short and long-term outlooks.  
 
Middle East 
Qatar has been a global leader in LNG exports and will continue to be a major player even by 
only staying on current course. The CEO of Qatargas recently commented on the impacts of 
shale gas: ”Gas prices will remain regionalized for the foreseeable future and the North 
American exports pricing structure will not attain the scale and pace that would allow it to 
significantly alter the current pricing structure in the regional markets of Europe and Asia” 
(Miles and Holmberg, 2014). His statement is in contiguous with natural gas analyst Bill 
Powers, claiming that US LNG predictions are overly optimistic.  
 
Summing up competitive rivalry and supply power  
The US could become a supplier in the long term, but this relies on a lot of factors. The 
current state of their infrastructure and the reduction in the high production rates could mean 
further postponement of the US as a major LNG exporter.  In regards to Russia, Africa and 
Qatar they are, and have the reserves and commercial viability to be major actors in the LNG 
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supply market on both short and long-term outlooks. A recent report from the International 
Gas Union (IGU) has projected that the US will not have their export LNG train projects 
online until 2017, which underlines the point about not becoming a major supplier in the short 
term (IGU, 2014).  
 
6.2.2 BUYERS 
Europe 
With an economic downturn and reduction in natural gas demand as mentioned earlier, 
analysts see the continent recuperating from this downturn resulting in a increased natural gas 
demand. The U.K. and Spain have been and will likely remain as major importers of LNG in 
Europe. The European market is offering a price around 10 USD/mmBtu compared to Asian 
prices at just short of 20 USD/mmBtu, making suppliers of LNG focus their attention on Asia 
(Platts, 2014). This could result in higher price in Europe, which is positive for a Norwegian 
supplier because of the already committed gas infrastructure and a shorter shipping distance.  
 
Latin America 
Many of the countries in South America are net importers of LNG, particularly Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil. As the region is growing in demand, they have been competing with the 
Asian market for LNG imports. Especially in Brazil were LNG is used as a buffer for drought 
conditions with reduction in hydro power, we see short term increases in spot prices because 
of already tight global demand. During the World Cup being held in Brazil this summer, the 
LNG imports may increase to have sufficient electricity during the tournament, probably 
causing price peaks in the LNG market.  
 
Asia 
The race for the Asian market premium has been a common statement after the Fukushima 
disaster in Japan in 2011. Experts are expecting demand to grow in Japan, South Korea and 
India (Miles and Holmberg, 2014). The region is very promising for high demand and stable 
high price in short term perspective.  In the long-term perspective analyst are predicting that 
the high prices in Asia will continue. Japan, which get their energy supplied nearly only by 
LNG, is still in large energy deficit. Even three years after the Fukushima incident its 
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predicted that only 14 of the 45 nuclear reactors resume production (DN.no, 2014). 
Nonetheless, nuclear power only being 30% of Japanese total production, there is still good 
indications for LNG supply on both short and long term. 
 
Summing up buyers 
Asia has been, and will most likely be the driver of global demand in the LNG market. But 
even though most of the attention is focused towards the Asian market, there are still other 
buyers such as the South America market eager for supply of LNG. A market with 
competition for demand is highly attractive for Norwegian export outlooks. Also, with the 
main attention from the suppliers focused on the Asian and South American markets, this 
could mean higher prices in Europe as well. In addition, Russia provides natural gas to Europe 
mainly through Ukraine. The current crisis has yet to interrupt exports, but if this would 
become a reality, prices would spike up also in the European market (Bloomberg, 2014).  
 
As of today, the regional market prices, especially in Asia and South America, are very 
attractive for LNG exports. The European market is returning to its normal course after a 
small economic downturn and there could be promising times for LNG production and export 
both on short and long-term basis.  However, we still have to emphasize the importance of 
Japan, which is the main driver as the world’s largest LNG importer.  
 
6.2.3 NEW ENTRANTS 
Huge capital investments are necessary to enter the LNG supply industry. In addition, most of 
the companies operating with LNG are major petroleum companies, most of which are 
positioned in all parts of the value chain. The development from exploration and production to 
distribution is very capital intensive and is highly regulated and governed. Additionally, there 
are high levels of technological and financial risk involved in such investments. The trend is 
that already well-established companies in the petroleum industry are investing in LNG 
transportation capabilities. It is definitely affordable for actors to enter into the market if they 
are of a certain size, but often when investing in LNG there are financial imposes. The banks 
issuing loans for these projects require contracts to be in place, to secure against the financial 
risk involved. “Even companies the size of Chevron don’t build LNG plants without having 
contracts in hand” says Chief executive officer of Chevron John Watson (Penty and Olson, 
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2014). He adds that there are no worries for LNG export oversupply, because the facilities are 
simply too expensive to build without any buyers in place.  
 
Due to the costs and financial risk involved in building LNG export capacity, the threat of 
new entrants in the LNG supply market is considered low. There are predictions in the 
outlooks made by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that there would be a potential 
oversupply in LNG, but Chris Finlayson, CEO of BG Group says otherwise: “As an industry 
that tends to systematically overestimate future supply and underestimate demand, we have 
been here before” (Lngindustry.com, 2014). LNG exports forecasts from the US and their 
predictions seem to be somewhat optimistic, which is a compiled understanding in the natural 
gas industry.  
 
6.2.4 SUBSTITUTES 
According to the IEA (2013) natural gas is expected to have a higher growth rate than oil. In 
their projections natural gas is expected to gain a significant share in the energy sector. Even 
though substitutes such as oil and coal have strongly developed infrastructures compared to 
LNG, the industry still has better projections compared to its substitutes (IEA, 2013).   
 
Even though there is an increased focus on the environment, CO2 emissions have continued to 
rise. Natural gas emits 40% less CO2 than burning oil, and 78% less than by burning coal, 
which is a clear advantage for natural gas against its substitutes (Fairbanks Natural Gas, 
2005). Natural gas provides a cost-effective bridge towards a low-carbon future for fossil fuel 
production.  
 
In regards to LNG transportation there are no substitutes other than pipelines. Transportation 
of natural gas through offshore pipelines compared to LNG is not economical for distances 
longer than 1600 km, which means that there are no substitutes for LNG transportation 
between regional markets (Durr et al., 2005). However, the advantage of using pipelines for 
shorter distances is that there is no need to build expensive liquefaction and regasification 
facilities. Nonetheless, pipelines are fixed and will never offer the same flexibility as LNG.  
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Figure 6.1: Summary five forces 
 
6.3 SUMMING UP 
Summing up the analysis we see that the main threat lies in the competitive rivalry and supply 
power. In this type of market a high level of competence is required to compete with the 
major suppliers such as the US and Russia. The cost intensive nature of the industry implies 
that high investment capital is a necessity. If those two components are met from an 
investment perspective, there are no high threats from other market forces. The limited threats 
increase the potential overall profit and make it an attractive market to invest in.  
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7 PRICE FORECASTS 
In order to do a quantitative valuation of having a LNG carrier, we need future prices for both 
regional markets included in our cases: Japan and Europe. Firstly we will do an empirical 
analysis of the data we use. Further, a model will be fitted to each of the two time series 
created from the data. By fitting a model we will be able to create statistical forecasts with 
prediction intervals. These statistical forecasts will then be a baseline for the creation of three 
different price scenarios based on judgmental forecasting. 
 
7.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATURAL GAS PRICES 
The years from 2006 to December 2008 describe the “super cycle” observed up to the start of 
the financial crisis. As a result of economic recession there was supply abundance driving the 
prices down. US prices has from then sustained at low levels due to the shale gas revolution 
and the domestic energy policy. From the beginning of 2011 the regional prices starts to drift 
and forming the current price situation.  
 
For both Japan and European prices there is a long-term increase in the data. This positive 
trend is especially visible in the LNG price in Japan, where the price in the sample started just 
above 5 USD/mmBtu, and ends at around 17 USD/mmBtu. To see if there are seasonal 
patterns in the data series, seasonal deviation plots are made. Figure 7.1 and 7.2 shows 
seasonal subseries, where the data for each month is plotted in separate mini plots.  
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Figure 7.1 and 7.2: Seasonal plot of monthly natural gas price in Europa and Japan 
 
The horizontal lines are the means for each month. Neither the data series for Japan, nor the 
data series for Europe show any major signs of a seasonal cycle. From the means of each 
month it is possible to see that there is a minor difference between the summer and the winter 
months. For that reason, seasonality will not be included in the modeling or the future prices. 
If daily spot prices had been used instead of monthly averages we probably would have had 
clearer seasonal effects for both time series. This is because of the price spikes, and thereby 
increased volatility, during the winter compared to the summer (Alterman, 2012).  
 
7.2 MODELING PROCEDURE 
From here on we will analyze the two time series separately, as they might show different 
traits. Further we will fit a non-seasonal ARIMA model to each set of time series data.  
 
7.2.1 JAPAN TIME SERIES 
From the plot of the time series (Figure 4.1) it seems that there is a minor change in variance, 
which usually means heteroskedasticity.  This suggests that the time series should be power 
transformed to make it more stable. From figure 7.3 we see that the maximum log-likelihood 
of the parameter λ equals to -0,585.  
70 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Maximum log-likelihood of Box-Cox transformation, Japan time series 
 
Figure 7.4: Power transformed Japan time series with λ = -0,585  
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Figure 7.5: Time plot and ACF and PACF plots for first degree differencing of power 
transformed Japan time series 
 
The transformed time series in Figure 7.4 is clearly non-stationary as it wanders upwards. 
Consequently, a differencing of the data is done. The data seemed to be somewhat stationary 
after a first differencing, as seen in Figure 7.5, except for a huge variance cluster around 2009. 
This is very likely to affect the accuracy of the model. The PACF in Figure 7.5 suggests an 
AR(2) model. The initial candidate model is ARIMA(2,1,0) . After fitting some variations of 
this candidate model, ARIMA(2,1,2) shows a slightly lower AICc. Since R does not give any 
p-values in the output, the significance of the coefficients can be calculated by z = estimated 
coeff. / std. error of coeff.  If |z| > 1.96, the estimated coefficient is significantly different from 
0. Looking at Figure 7.6 none of the coefficients have an absolute z-score lower than 1,96.  
 
 
Figure 7.6: R output with ARIMA (2,1,2) fitted to Japan time series 
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Figure 7.7: Plot and ACF of residuals (lag is in years) from ARIMA(2,1,2) fitted to Japan 
time series 
 
   
Figure 7.8 and 7.9: Q-Q Plot and histogram of residuals from ARIMA(2,1,2) fitted to Japan 
time series 
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Figure 7.10: Box-Ljung test of the residuals from ARIMA(2,1,2) fitted to Japan time series 
 
The plot of the residuals seems to be reverting around a value of 0, but there are some clusters 
of positive and negative volatility, respectively around 2008 and 2009 (Figure 7.7). From the 
ACF plot we can see that there is no significant correlation in the residuals. To further test 
that the residuals were not distinguishable from white noise a portmanteau test was done. The 
lowest of the p-values for lags in              , was 0,1062. Although this was rather 
close to the significance level, every other p-value was relatively high, indicating that there 
could be independence. Nonetheless, the histogram of the residuals does not seem to be 
normally distributed, which means that the model did not perfectly capture information in the 
data. It is slightly skewed to the right and has some outliers. The question is therefore: is there 
a better model? Many of the outliers, as seen in the Q-Q Plot, are identified to be around the 
time of the financial crisis. In addition, there is an unexplained sudden spike mid-2002. 
During the financial crisis around 2009, the variance increased, and this is an event that 
cannot be predicted only using a univariate time series analysis. This is also supported by 
comparing the standardized residuals plot and the plot of the first differenced time series 
(Figure 7.5 and 7.7). Obviously, one cannot simply ignore an event like that, as it probably 
could happen in the future. By using a model that does not capture such sudden changes, the 
prediction intervals computed assuming a normal distribution may be inaccurate. However, 
the forecast baseline will probably be quite good. Box said that all models are wrong, but 
some are useful (Hyndman, 2014b). The purpose of this statistical forecasting was to get a set 
of values that will be adjusted using judgment, and finally used in a valuation analysis. Hence, 
the forecast values from the fitted ARIMA model will be used.  
 
7.2.2 EUROPE TIME SERIES 
Just as with the Japan time series, the one for European natural gas prices seems to have a 
minor change in variance around and after year 2008. A power transformation with λ equal to 
1/7 was done.  
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Figure 7.11: Maximum log-likelihood of Box-Cox transformation, Europe time series 
 
Figure 7.12: Time plot and ACF and PACF plots for first degree differencing of power 
transformed Europe time series 
 
The transformed Europe time series seemed to be somewhat stationary after a first 
differencing, except for a huge variance clusters around 2008-2009 and one of the first 
months of 2010. This is very likely to make the residuals look nothing like white noise, and 
thereby affecting the model’s accuracy in a much greater extent than the japan time series. To 
avoid this, the length of the time series was changed. Instead of starting in year 2000, which 
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did not include a spot term from NBP, the alternative transformed time series starts in April 
2010. By doing so, the strength of the longer term forecast is somewhat diminished. However, 
the long-term forecasts include a judgmental evaluation.    
 
The ACF in Figure 7.13 shows that the first differenced shorter time series looks like white 
noise. The model ARIMA(0,1,0) without growth also had the lowest AICc.   
 
 
Figure 7.13: Time plot and ACF and PACF plots for first degree differencing of alternative 
power transformed Europe time series 
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Figure 7.14: Plot and ACF of residuals (lag is in years) from ARIMA(0,1,0) fitted to 
alternative Europe time series 
 
 
Figure 7.15 and 7.16: Q-Q Plot and histogram of residuals from ARIMA(0,1,0) fitted to 
alternative Europe time series 
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Figure 7.17: Box-Ljung test of the residuals from ARIMA(0,1,0) fitted to alternative Europe 
time series 
 
The ACF indicates that the residuals are white noise. A Box-Ljung test also shows that there 
is a possibility of independence. But, the Q-Q Plot and the histogram of the residuals does not 
show normal distribution and there are quite a few outliers. One possibility is that by 
shortening the time series there is simply too few data points to fit a good model.  The data 
could also be distorted, as it consists of many different natural gas prices in Europe. Hence, 
the average estimate does not follow the same movements as a single spot price would have 
done. In addition, there could be some skewness to how these prices constituting the data, are 
moving relative to each other, and/or the weighting of them.    
 
7.3 STATISTICAL FUTURE PRICES 
Since both models were estimated with the use of a power transformation, the forecasts were 
back-transformed with their respective λ -value. As a consequence, both forecasts’ upper 95% 
and 80% prediction intervals “sky rocketed” respectively after 2020 and 2030 equaling non-
realistic prices, and was not included. For the Japan time series, the forecast mean has some 
minor changes until it stabilizes at 14,37 USD/mmBtu in 2017 (Figure 7.18). The statistical 
forecast mean for Europe is 10,88 USD/mmBtu (Figure 7.19). For both time series the lower 
prediction intervals exponentially decline. Although there is a possibility of the market 
becoming efficient and prices converge, it is very unlikely that they go below the lower 95% 
or even lower 80% prediction interval. If the market becomes efficient the margins will 
probably stay positive, but to a much lesser extent. However, if the prices become too low, the 
production and transportation costs will not be covered, resulting in negative margins. In turn, 
this means that there will be less willingness to explore and produce natural gas. As a baseline 
for the judgmental adjustments, the prices will not go under the lower 95% prediction 
interval. 
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7.3.1 JAPAN 
 
Figure 7.18: Future LNG price in Japan, mean (blue) and lower 80% (light grey) and 95% 
(dark grey) prediction intervals 
 
7.3.2 EUROPE 
 
Figure 7.19: Future natural gas price in Europe, mean (blue) and lower 80% (light grey) and 
95% (dark grey) prediction intervals 
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7.4 JUDGMENTAL PRICE SCENARIOS 
Using a systematic and well-structured approach we will here create price scenarios based on 
the statistical forecasts and the strategic analysis of the market in Chapter 6. The forecasts will 
be categorized either by a high, medium or low price scenario, and remain constant after a 10-
year period. The reason for doing so is that we have no argumentation beyond a relative long-
term basis of 10 years. Adjustments beyond this period would be mere guesses.  
 
Over the past five years a surge of optimism for US unconventional gas production have 
transformed North America from an LNG importer to a possible frontier for LNG exports. 
While global LNG demand continues to grow, North American imports are dropping 
simultaneously as investments in LNG export capabilities are bottlenecked by government 
approval. With continued rise in price differentials between the Asian and North American 
market, investors are eager to take advantage of the situation. The US has the largest queue of 
projects in the LNG industry, with 28 liquefaction projects has been proposed, representing 
nearly 285 MTPA of those 188 MTPA with already announced start dates (IGU, 2014).  
 
In the low price scenario the high demand for LNG and a high historical price level has 
allowed many projects to be accepted. The focus on the high profits from the Asian premium 
market has led to an oversupply, as big players such as the US, Russia and Australia 
intensives their production and exports. Such a growth in LNG supply could lead to a drastic 
price reduction and convergence in prices, making the market become more efficient. Japan 
has been an important driver behind the growth of LNG by being the number one importer 
after the Fukushima incident. In this scenario they resume their nuclear power production, and 
thereby reduce their need for LNG. The prices in this low scenario will steadily drop down to 
8 USD/mmBtu and 9 USD/mmBtu in Europe and Japan respectively after 2024. 
 
In addition to difficult regulatory approval process, US liquefaction projects also face some 
commercial uncertainty, which could further limit LNG exports. Regulatory obstacles 
combined with desire not to repeat the regasification overbuild phenomenon of the late 2000s 
causing high price volatility at henry hub, LNG export projects will most likely be limited to 
the end of the decade. If many of those projects go as planned it may cause an oversupply, 
which the LNG industry cannot absorb, causing prices to decline. In the medium scenario the 
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US does not manage to export as much LNG as planned. Australia and Russia increase their 
exports, but the overall demand, especially in Asia, grows at the same rate, maintaining the 
price-levels of today. The statistical forecast will be used as a baseline, as there are no 
significant shifts in current market dynamics for this medium scenario. 
 
In order to include the US as a major exporter of LNG, a lot of factors have to fall in place, as 
mentioned in the strategic analysis. In the high price scenario, neither the US, Russia nor 
Australia manages to increase exports as much as the growth of LNG consumption. Here, 
demand in Asia and Europe will grow at a quicker rate than new supply arises, causing the 
market prices to rise with a spread similar of today. In this price scenario the prices will 
steadily grow up to 16 USD/mmBtu and 20 USD/mmBtu in Europe and Japan respectively 
after 2024. 
 
 
Figure 7.20: Future price scenarios in Europe and Japan 
 
7.5 FORWARD PRICE 
In the first case we have a forward contract towards the European market. A spot-forward 
relationship with the assumption of no-arbitrage is a common way of pricing a forward 
contract in a commodity market. The forward price for a maturity T determined as       is 
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In this equation r is the continuously compound interest rate prevailing at date t for maturity T 
and y is the convenience yield of the commodity (Geman, 2005). The convenience yield is an 
adjustment to the cost of carry in the non-arbitrage pricing formula. The cost of carry 
hypothesis is the theory that the forward price is equal to the spot price plus the cost of carry. 
The cost of carry can be formulated as the cost of storing a physical commodity over a period 
of time.  
 
We are interested in a forward contract for a period of up to 40 years, thus the cost of carry is 
too far into the future in order to make a suitable figure. After 40 years the common 
perception may be converging natural gas prices minus the transportation costs between the 
various regional markets. With converging prices and a more efficient market the defining 
powers of the market price is supply and demand. In this case a forecast of future supply and 
demand would be necessary for a forward price. In a conservative forecast, with higher supply 
than demand on long term due to massive projects in the US, a downgrading of the price on 
long term could occur. This is reflected in the low price scenario. 
 
A forward price between two parties is commonly the difference between the spot price and a 
forward price premium. Such a long life span for a forward contract puts all the risk is on the 
issuer of the contract. The issuer of the contract therefore requires compensation in the form 
of the mentioned forward premium in case 1. As a supplier it is important that the forward 
price also is above the break-even price of the supply costs, in order to make the contract 
profitable. The current spot price at NBP is 11 USD/mmBtu (Platts, 2014) Meanwhile, the 
break-even price when transportation to Milford Haven is accounted for is 6,8 USD/mmBtu. 
Accordingly the forward price should be somewhere in between these two figures. In the low 
price scenario the price in Europe is 8 at its lowest. We therefore assume a forward price of 
8,5 USD/mmBtu.  
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8 INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
What we have done so far is to describe the market situation and the economic availability 
from a qualitative approach, and forecasted a set of price scenarios for Europe and Japan. The 
purpose of this next part is to investigate from the economic value of different LNGC 
utilization from a quantitative approach. In order to find the economic value we must establish 
an investment proposal, the economic tool of evaluation and the scenarios from our 
Norwegian point of view. 
 
8.1 SHIPPING ASSUMPTIONS 
There are two shipping possibilities towards the Asian market from Hammerfest, through the 
Suez Canal and through the NSR. We assume that there are 365 days a year available for 
sailing. In order to get an accurate measure of the distance involved in shipping from Melkøya 
to Yokohama harbor in Japan, we have used some of the estimates made by Tschudi shipping 
Company AS. The company has a long history from operating in conventional and 
unconventional shipping markets, and has made calculations about the route through an 
international knowledge hub called the Centre for High North Logistics (Gunnarsson, 2013). 
These calculations offer a good estimate of the distance; however it is important to mention 
that these numbers may vary depending on conditions. Changes in ice structure from one year 
to the next means that voyages through the NSR never are identical. For our calculations 
going through the NSR we will use an average speed of 13 knots and a distance of 5,800 nm. 
These numbers give us a preliminary idea of the distance and time benefits for sailing through 
the NSR compared to the Suez Channel. The distance used between Hammerfest and 
Yokohama going through the Suez Canal is set to 12,500 nm. The Suez Canal route is to be 
considered blue water, meaning that there are no limitations, unlike the Arctic route, to speed.  
The average speed for this route will be 19 knots, which is assumed to be the most cost 
effective speed for the ship we are investing in. 
 
The Japan spot case will be based on going through NSR during the summer months, and 
through the Suez Canal the rest of the year. The NSR is assumed to be open five months of 
the year, which equals to 150 days. The reason for using this alternative is the potential of 
costs and time saved, compared to the Suez route. For the scenario towards the European 
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market our assumptions is based on a voyage from Hammerfest to a LNG terminal in Milford 
Haven, in the UK. This voyage is also a blue water route, and the average speed will also be 
19 knots. This one-way distance is 1,500 nm (Sea-distance.org, 2014). Every scenario is 
based on round trips. This means that the LNG carrier would return to Melkøya with an empty 
cargo hold. With the mentioned speed and distance in mind, the number of days is takes for a 
round trip from Hammerfest to Yokohama and Milford Haven can be calculated. 
 
In order to not make the calculations to complicated, there are no stops along the route. In 
addition, the ship requires 3 days for loading/unloading, documentation, discharging, and any 
waiting time, in each port (Canaport LNG, 2013). To calculate the days for a round trip we 
use the following formulas: 
 
                       (
             
                  
                ) 
 
                                                      
 
With these assumptions we get the following sailing and round trip days for each voyage: 
 Hammerfest ↔ Milford Haven = 6,6 + 6 = 12,6 days 
 Hammerfest ↔ Yokohama (Suez Canal) = 54,8 + 6 = 60,8 days 
 Hammerfest ↔ Yokohama (NSR) = 37,2 + 6 = 43,2 days 
 
For the Milford Haven and Suez Canal voyages it is straightforward to find the number of 
round trips per year given the assumptions above, and we are going to illustrate this through 
the Suez Canal scenario: 
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For the Milford Haven scenario we get 29 round trips. The following calculation can illustrate 
the benefit of additionally using the NSR, as compared to only using the Suez Canal, to get to 
Japan: 
 
                                
        
    
   
            
    
   
 
Specifically, we get 3,47 round trips per year using the NSR. We will calculate 3 round trips 
plus for both Japan routes, and one were the ship goes eastbound through NSR and westbound 
through the Suez.  
 
8.1.1 THE LNG CARRIER 
For all cases we will base our costs on a fictive LNG carrier with Ice class 1A, delivered in 
the second project year, i.e. 2016. The vessel will be winterized. Winterization is 
modifications of a vessel that ensures safe, effective and efficient operations in freezing 
temperatures (Sawhill, 2013). The focus lies on controlling the adverse effects of icing, 
freezing, wind chill and material properties in cold temperatures. These modifications 
includes: structural design to reduce icing and cold exposure, heating, insulation and drainage, 
mechanical de-icing, and weather shielding. To run these modifications, more electricity is 
needed. Hence, the vessel has increased fuel consumption when sailing in Arctic waters. 
Logically, a vessel sailing slower will use less fuel. However, for the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that the fuel consumption going through the NSR and blue waters are the same. Ice 
class rules on vessels are requirements for hull strengthening and machinery for navigation 
through icy waters. A vessel that has these specifications is essential to our investment 
analysis, as one of the routes goes through the Arctic.   
 
The average capacity of ships in the new-build orders of 2013 was 165 000 m
3
 (IGU, 2014). 
This will also be the cargo capacity of the ship in the valuation. We assume the BOG to be 
roughly 0,15% of the cargo per day, which covers the daily bunker fuel consumption at the 19 
knots, and 13 knots through the NSR. The vessels have a Tri-Fuel Diesel Electric (TFDE) 
propulsion; this enables use of either marine gas oil, heavy fuel oil (HFO) or LNG depending 
on the respective price and availability. This means that the preferred fuel can be changed 
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over time. In gas-mode TDFE generators use a pilot fuel in addition to the gas fuel. The 
percentage of which the pilot fuel is used in gas-mode is set to 5%, as used in a study of LNG 
fuel by GL and MAN (Andersen, Clausen and Sames, 2011). The pilot fuel can either be 
marine gas oil or HFO. Although the generators use a higher share of fuel oil during lower 
loads, we will for the simplicity assume that they run in gas-mode all the time. The daily fuel 
consumption will therefore consist of: 
 
              (               )                              
 
                
(               )             
    
                  
 
All conversion factors used can be found in Appendix 1. The pilot fuel represents only a small 
share of the daily fuel consumption, and the total cost. As a consequence, we will not focus 
too much on it. The price for HFO is assumed to be 650 USD/ton for the whole lifetime of the 
LNG carrier. The consumption of fuel is voyage-specific, and will be presented later.       
 
Since we are doing an investment analysis from a Norwegian producer’s standpoint, the BOG 
used for fuel comes rather cheap. The alternative would be to use HFO or another fuel oil 
equivalent (FOE) to transport the BOG to a market, and sell it at a market price. However, 
this would imply that all of the BOG was re-liquefied. The process of re-liquefying and re-
storing BOG requires electricity, which again means a higher HFO or FOE consumption. 
Additionally, having re-liquefaction equipment on the vessel would probably also increase the 
initial investment required. Thus, both options are fraught with advantages and disadvantages. 
A HFO price of 650 USD/ton equals 15,3 USD/mmBtu (Andersen, Clausen and Sames, 
2011). Hence, the carrier will run on gas-mode. Furthermore, the use of LNG as a fuel has 
environmental advantages compared to the substitutes (IGU, 2014).  
 
All measurements of the investment object will be based on Meridian Spririt, owned by 
Meridian Spirit ApS (MarineTraffic, 2014). These measurements are very relevant to the 
voyage-specific costs. 
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8.2 COST OF EQUITY 
8.2.1 RISK EVALUATION 
To find the cost of equity we first have to estimate the risk. Measured as variance, the beta 
coefficient in the Capital Asset Pricing Model quantifies risk. The model assumes that the 
investor is well-diversified, and therefore holds no non-systematic risk. In order to assess the 
risk of this project(s) we have to evaluate the market elements that impact the expected return 
of the asset. We do this by addressing major risk factors. For each risk element we assign a 
risk factor between 1 (low risk) and 5 (high risk). To assess the risk of an LNG project there 
are three levels of market risk important to analyze (Kotzot et al., 2007): 
 Project level risk 
 Sovereign risk 
 Institutional business and legal risk 
 
Project level risk 
Project level risk concerns the contractual foundation that protects the investors from market, 
operating and ownership risk. In regards to ownership we assume that there is no risk, since 
we want to quantify the risk of the project.  
 
LNG contract risk addresses the financial predictability and reliability of the buyer. High 
stability and low risk is associated with long-term contracts. In our forward case the risk 
factor of the project will be 1, since we are fully hedged through the lifetime of the LNGC. In 
our other cases, where we only trade on spot, the risk factor will be 5. In these two cases the 
project is vulnerable to price volatility, power of the buyer and other market powers. As these 
are high(er) risk cases, the β should be higher than in the forward-case.   
 
Technology, construction and operations are crucial to the dependability of the project. These 
risks can be broken down into pre delivery and post-delivery risk. For this investment the pre-
construction would be how dependable the delivery of our LNGC from the shipyard is. This is 
considered a medium risk factor (3) for all cases, because of the possibility of delayed 
delivery and its implications on the NPV. The post-delivery risk would be if the project runs 
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successfully to generate revenues for debt service. Since there has been some production stops 
at Snøhvit we are going to set this risk factor at medium (3). Even though Statoil has dealt 
with the problem, there is a risk that this might happen again. If there is a production shut-
down, the vessel has no product to deliver, so this will be a medium risk for all cases. In our 
spot cases we will be shipping through Suez and/or NSR. These routes yields a higher 
operational risk than sailing in blue water in Western Europe, and will therefore have a 
medium to high risk factor at 4. (Even though Case 2 involves sailing in blue water, we will 
for simplicity estimate one beta for all spot cases.) 
 
Competitive market exposure depends on the cost of production relative to the market, and is 
essential for the project risk. Low profit margins means that the project is more exposed to 
price volatility, which brings concerns if the project will generate profit or losses, causing it to 
be a high risk factor. If the project has high margins, even if market prices are reduced 
dramatically, the chance of generating revenue and managing loan payments is higher. High 
margins would therefore equal a low risk factor. In the spot trading cases, none of the cargoes 
are hedged against market exposure. This offers very high market risk factor (5). Even though 
the margins between the current market price and cost of production are high, there is no 
guaranteed sales price, so this risk has to be taken into account. For our forward contract case 
all our sales are hedged, making competitive exposure low, equaling a risk factor of 1. 
 
In regards to operational risk, and the risk of the reservoir being used before the lifetime of 
the asset expires: The Snøhvit field consists of 244 billion cubic meters of natural gas (NPD, 
2014). Looking at any case where the shipments go to Milford Haven only, throughout the 
LNGC lifetime, the deliveries totals about 112 billion cubic meters of natural gas. This is a 
big part of the field. We can correspondingly assume that the proposed ship is not the only 
one loading LNG from the Melkøya plant. (This is later discussed in the Conclusion, 9.2.1 
Limitations.) Another important point to this risk factor is that the investment payments are 
done after the first 10 years after delivery, so if the field should run out, the loan payments are 
covered. This will be rated as a medium risk factor at 3 for all scenarios.  
 
Counter party exposure includes risk from other participants in our operations such as LNG 
buyers and how reliable they are. Major LNG buyers and counterparts who do business in the 
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LNG market are well-established companies with strong economic foundation. Therefore this 
risk factor set to 1. 
 
In addition to the factors above, there are several other factors regarding the overall risk 
assessment:  
The legal structure of the operations is considered very low because the operations are from 
Norway. The Norwegian government has long experience with petroleum industry, and taxes 
and other import duties are relatively predictable and consistent.  
 
The currency risk is considered medium since we operate out of Norway and our income is in 
USD. Currency fluctuations between USD and NOK are obviously a risk factor. Although 
some of the port dues are in GBP, the small amount makes it negligible. 
 
In the forward case the liquidity of the operations is rather good, because the operation is 
hedged and there is a high predictability of cash flows. In this case liquidity risk is very low 
(1). In the spot cases this risk factor is rated high (5), because of low predictability of future 
cash flows.  
 
The result of our forecasting is based on historical prices and judgmental adjustments. In our 
forward case the forecasting risk factor is 1, because it is of no concern. In the spot cases the 
risk factor is considered high (5) because of the difficulty of predicting prices the next 40 
years.  
 
Sovereign risk 
The country-rating factor gives an indication of the security or the territorial risk for the 
investment. Country risk include local business environment, economic and political issues. 
Norway has an AAA sovereign S&P rating, and the sovereign risk factor is considered to be 
low (1) (Damodoran, 2014a) 
 
Institutional business and legal risk 
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This risk factor concerns the existence of vital businesses and legal institutions not covered by 
the sovereign country risk. These risk are considered to be very low (1) in the LNG market, as 
the market has a well-developed legal structure and our operations are in well-established 
markets.  
 
Summing up 
The risks from the three categories are summed, and a β that represent the risk of the 
investment is estimated.  The β is used in to calculate the cost of equity in CAPM, and will be 
further used to establish the cost of capital for the cases. The forward case is here “low”, and 
spot cases are “high”: 
Investment risk  Low High 
LNG contract risk  1 5 
    
Technology and construction Contract delivery (pre-delivery) 3 3 
 Operational risk (post-delivery) 3 4 
    
Competitive market exposure Market exposure (profit margin) 1 5 
 Operational risk (reservoir) 3 3 
    
Counter party exposure  2 2 
Legal structure  1 1 
Currency risk  3 3 
Liquidity risk  1 3 
Forecasting risk  1 5 
    
Project level risk  1,9 3,4 
    
Sovereign risk  1 1 
Relative institutional risk  1 1 
    
Total risk (β)  1,300 1,8 
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The big difference between the two different β is the market exposure, and it is clearly 
represented in table below as we see a 0,5 higher β in the high risk cases compared to the low 
risk case. Since we are looking at an investment from a Norwegian stand point we can assume 
that the investor is well diversified. Hence, the measure of β in the table represents the market 
risk, i.e. the systematic risk that cannot be diversified.   
  
8.2.2 CAPM 
Risk-free rate 
To calculate the CAPM we need a risk free rate. Based on the yield of a 10-year Norwegian 
government bond this gives a risk-free rate of 2,58% (Norges Bank, 2014).  
 
Market premium 
The market premium must reflect the additional return an investor can get when investing in a 
market of a specific country. One way to estimate the equity risk premium for a country is to 
add country risk premium to a mature market premium. There are several ways of estimating 
mature equity risk premium. We will use the latest update (May, 2014) of the implied equity 
risk premium estimated by Damodaran (2014b). Adding CDS default spread of 0, based on 
the AAA sovereign rating of Norway from S&P, we get a market premium of 5,12% 
(Damodaran, 2014a; Damodaran, 2014b). 
 
Summing up CAPM 
By summing up all the factors in the CAPM-model estimated in the previous sections we can 
compute the cost of equity for both low and high-risk cases: 
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The two different costs of capital now reflect the risk of the cases.  Further, we will use these 
numbers to estimate the WACC. 
 
8.3 COST OF DEBT 
Most LNG export projects use a financing framework typical for large-scale, long-term 
industrial and public facility constructions. The financing structure is dependent on 
investment size, the source of risk involved, and the capacity increase absorbing the risk, and 
is compared against the expected return (Lee, 2013b). According to Thakur (2011) the 
financing of a LNG vessel usually consists of a mix of debt and equity in the ratio of 4:1. It is 
further stated that for low risk projects the equity portion can be as low as 10%, and for high-
risk projects it can be as high as 30-50% (Kotzot et al., 2007). For the low risk case we 
assume an equity portion of 20%. For the spot trade cases it can be assumed that the banks 
issuing the loan for the investment require a higher share of equity, due to the higher risk. In 
these cases we will assume an equity portion of 40%. This will also affect the difference 
WACC of  
 
Out of the initial investment, 200 million USD is financed with a loan in our forward case and 
150 million USD in our spot cases. We base this financing on a project finance, which means 
that the lenders loan money for the investment, solely based on the specific risk of the project 
and its future cash flows. The arrangement creates a separate legal entity to house debt and 
equity exclusively for the venture, and the projects cash flows then becomes the only source 
of repayment (Lee, 2013b).  
 
Since there may be a risk of oversupply in the shipping industry because of higher increase in 
new builds compared to estimated necessity for LNG shipping, there is a risk of supply glut 
(Tsolakis, 2014). This would mean a higher supply than demand for LNGC, causing a 
reduced charter rates. Since we are investing in an LNGC for the purpose of shipping 
exclusively from Snøhvit, we are not exposed to shipping market risk. The risk of our 
operation, discussed in the industry strategic analysis, is reduced to price risk of the 
commodity, such as the US on long-term basis. Because of this, the payback period is set to 
10 years, rather than the lifetime of the ship. In this way the price risk on long-term is 
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transferred to the project rather than the banks. For the forward case we assume a real loan 
rate of 5%. In the two other cases with spot, there is a higher risk and therefore we assume a 
higher loan rate of 10%. The ship has a delivery time of 2 years, therefore the payments to the 
shipyard is made in installments based on percentages of the contract price and certain 
milestones achieved in the construction. For simplicity, the payments are made in two equal 
installments over the two first years of the project. Banks have a higher willingness to come in 
with finance once steel cutting on the vessel has begun (OECD Council Working Party on 
Shipbuilding, 2007). However, it is assumed that the loan is provided equally over the two 
first years. No payments on the loan are made until the vessel is completed and has generated 
cash flows.  
 
8.4 WACC 
The WACC equation is the cost of each capital component and is calculated for both the low 
risk and high risk cases after taxes. Here, WACC is not based on the capital structure of a 
company investing in the project, but on the project itself: 
 
         
  
   
        
   
   
                  
 
          
   
   
         
   
   
                   
 
8.5 SHIPPING COSTS 
Owning and using a ship for transportation between ports include different costs. The fixed 
costs are capital costs, and the variable costs are broken down into operating costs and voyage 
costs (Thakur, 2011).  
 
8.5.1 CAPITAL COSTS 
LNG carriers are technically advanced ships and are very costly with most new builds ranging 
at 200-250 million USD (Höegh LNG, 2011). Because of the Ice class, winterization and the 
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TFDE propulsion the total investment is assumed to be 250 million USD. The repayment of 
capital and depreciation highly influences the ship costs.  
 
Loan payments 
As an example we use the forward case loan contract, and the setup is similar for the spot 
cases. 
Forward contract loan  2016 2017 2018  2025 
Lifetime 1 2 3 … 10 
Interest payments 10 000 000 9 204 954 8 370 156  1 233 377 
Installments 15 900 915 16 695 961 17 530 759 … 24 667 538 
Sum 25 900 915 25 900 915 25 900 915 … 25 900 915 
 
Spot contract loan  2016 2017 2018  2025 
Lifetime 1 2 3 … 10 
Interest payments 15 000 000 14 058 819 13 023 520  2 219 255 
Installments 9 411 809 10 352 990 11 388 289 … 22 192 554 
Sum 24 411 809 24 411 809 24 411 809 … 24 411 809 
 
Depreciation and salvage value 
The depreciation is important in order allocate the costs of the assets to the period in which 
the asset is used. We assume the ship to a 40-year lifetime, and will be depreciated linearly.  
 
The lightweight tonnage of an LNGC is the unit for the fixed weight of the empty built ship 
and is commonly used as a basis for determining the scrap value, which is important in the 
depreciation estimation. Lightweight tonnage is found using the following formula (Pearn, 
2000): 
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This gave us a lightweight tonnage of 35 000. The salvage value for an LNGC 40 years ahead 
is difficult to predict, but using an estimate at today’s value at around 500 USD per ton, gives 
a scrap value of 17,5 million USD (Bondy, 2012). 
 
Depreciation 
(in millions) 
 First year 
of usage 
   
Lifetime 0 1 2 … 40 
Capex 250     
Yearly dep.  5,8125 5,8215  5,8125 
Salvage value     17,5 
 
As we can see from the table above, we get a yearly depreciation of 5,8125 million UDS. 
 
8.5.2 OPERATING COSTS 
Operating costs are non-trade-route specific costs and must be met before the vessel is clear 
for operations. Manning, basic insurance, repairs and maintenance are the most important 
operating cost elements (Thakur, 2011). These costs are the same for all three scenarios, and 
are assumed to be 15 000 USD per day (Höegh LNG, 2011). 
 
8.5.3 VOYAGE COSTS 
Voyage costs are the route specific costs. These consist of fuel consumption, port charges and 
canal tolls, where bunker/marine fuel is the main cost-item (Thakur, 2011). The amount of 
fuel a LNG vessel consumes is a function of speed, time and engine performance, haul design, 
cargo hold (i.e. laden or ballast) and weather conditions.  
 
The vessel will, for the sake of simplicity, use the same speed and fuel consumption laden as 
in ballast for the round trips. BOG amount will be 0,15% of the cargo per day (Total, 2012). 
The LNG burned during transport can be calculated through this formula: 
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Route 
Fuel consumed for one  
round trip 
Hammerfest 
↔ Milford 
Haven 
Hammerfest 
↔ Yokohama 
(Suez) 
Hammerfest 
↔ Yokohama 
(NSR) 
LNG cargo volume (m
3
) 165 000 165 000 165 000 
BOG during transport (m
3
) 1 633,5 13 563 9 207 
Net LNG volume for sale (m
3
) 163 366,5 151 437 155 793 
 
As we can see from the table we have an initial LNG cargo volume and we have a net LNG 
volume that is what we can really sell at the price of the buyer. Since the carrier propulsion 
runs on LNG, the laden trip limits the tanks be emptied completely. In any case, the storage 
tanks on the carrier are often required to hold a minimum amount, or a heel. This is assumed 
to be in addition to the cargo value, making the total storage volume larger than the cargo 
volume. The LNG burned during transport will be the cost of transportation, and will be 
subtracted as a cost based on production cost from the LNG plant, which is 5,8 USD/mmBtu. 
To provide an example we will illustrate one of the routes (Hammerfest → Milford Haven → 
Hammerfest) transport costs: 
 
                                                     
                                             
                              
 
Port dues 
Port dues and pilotage services are a part of the voyage-specific costs. The components can be 
complex and variable specific to berth or terminal used (Thakur, 2011). The charges are 
usually categorized by size. 
 
In Milford Haven there are entry charges for all vessels based on gross tonnage, and are 
estimated to be around 15 000 GBP (MHPA, 2013a). Due to limited line of sight from the 
bridge of a LNG carrier and its safety measures, Milford Haven has implemented an exclusion 
zone and a 1 mile controlled zone in both directions of the pilots (as seen in Figure 8.1). A 
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cost of 1 600 USD each way occurs to ensure that these zones are safe (Thakur, 2011). The 
pilotage and embarkation/disembarkation are roughly 12500 GBP each way (MHPA, 2013b). 
We assume an exchange rate of 0,62 USD/GBP for the whole valuation.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Illustration of exclusion and controlled zone (MHPA, 2013c) 
 
The port dues and pilotage cost in Yokohama are extremely complex, and are therefore 
assumed to be the same as for Meridian Spirit docking in Futtsu, Japan (Laurent, 2013, 
referenced in Haeffele, 2013, pp. 119). The same goes for the port of Hammerfest. We 
assume an exchange rate of 0,16 USD/NOK. 
 
Port dues Hammerfest Milford Haven Yokohama 
Port entry/berth hire 424 481 15 000 16 319 
Pilotage etc. 746 486 25 000 73 480 
Misc. 25 000 2 016 15 579 
Total 1 195 967 NOK 42 016 GBP 105 378 USD 
In USD 191 355 USD 67 768 USD 105 378 USD 
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NSR specific costs 
There are some additional costs that have to be taken into consideration to get an accurate cost 
estimate for going through the NSR. Eastbound the tariff is 5 USD per ton of cargo, and 
westbound the vessel has to pay 2,5 USD per ton of displacement weight (Gunnarsson, 2013). 
This gives us the following tariffs for an eastbound NSR voyage: 
 
         
           
                           
 
Westbound the 165 000   LNG ship has a displacement tonnage of 117 000 and gives us the 
following NSR tariffs: 
 
                                       
 
In addition to NSR tariffs we also have an insurance premium for the transit at 160 000 USD 
and ice breaker assistance at 11 250 USD, both for each passage. According to Lauritzen 
(2013, referenced in Haeffele, 2013, pp. 53) it is also necessary to pay for NSR administration 
approval. This approval is 30 000 USD eastbound and 15 000 USD westbound. 
 
Suez Canal specific costs 
When the ship goes through the Suez Canal there are transfer fees for both eastbound and 
westbound passages. These fees amount to 5 USD per ton of cargo eastbound, and 5 USD per 
per ton of displacement going westbound (Gunnarsson, 2013). This is calculated the same 
way as the NSR tariff, giving us a transfer fee of 589 286 USD eastbound and 620 000 USD 
westbound. In addition to this, there is an insurance premium for Suez Canal transfers, at 65 
000 USD for each passage (Haeffele, 2013).  
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Voyage costs, in USD Hammerfest ↔ 
Milford Haven 
Hammerfest ↔ 
Yokohama (Suez) 
Hammerfest ↔ 
Yokohama (NSR) 
Fuel costs 252 714 2 098 292 1 424 388 
NSR tariff eastbound   371 287 
NSR tariff westbound   292 500 
NSR insurance costs   320 000 
Ice breaker assistance   22 500 
-    
Suez transfer eastbound  371 287  
Suez transfer 
westbound 
 585 000  
Suez insurance costs  130 000  
-    
Port dues Hammerfest 191 355 191 355 191 355 
Port dues route specific 67 768 105 378 105 378 
-    
Sum Voyage Costs 511 837 3 481 312 2 727 408 
 
From the table above, we see that the savings is 753 913 USD for a round trip by going 
through the NSR instead of the Suez Canal. This is not as much as estimated by the Centre for 
High North Logistics mentioned earlier in the thesis, but that case was based on the same 
average speed through both passages (NSR and Suez Canal) and a charter rate rather than 
ownership of an LNG ship. Even though the costs saved are not as big, the important thing to 
remember is that the time saved is 17,6 days, which is quite a lot.  
 
8.5.4 COSTS NOT INCLUDED 
Access to regasification capacity in the defined ports is likely to be constrained, as the holders 
probably would seek to capture some of the benefits of delivering spot cargoes by raising 
rates for terminal access. However, we assume that there is no regasification rent. (Similarly 
to Free On Board (FOB) sales.) In addition, the Norwegian producer is also assumed to be 
well-established in the market, meaning that brokerage commissions are excluded from our 
total costs. 
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8.6 ANALYSIS OF CASE 1 
Case 1 is based on a forward contract to Milford Haven in UK, with a price of 8,5 
USD/mmBtu throughout the lifetime of the LNGC. The loan repayments reduce the cash 
flows only the first 10 years. The following years are equal, except for the last one where the 
salvage value is included: 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Forward contract          
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven          
Sales volume   113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263 
Sales price   8,50 8,50  8,50 8,50  8,50 8,50 
Revenues   966 222 737 966 222 737  966 222 737 966 222 737  966 222 737 966 222 737 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310 
Margin after OPEX  300 325 427 300 325 427  300 325 427 300 325 427  300 325 427 300 325 427 
Special taxes  0,51  153 165 968 153 165 968  153 165 968 153 165 968  153 165 968 153 165 968 
Margin after special taxes  147 159 459 147 159 459  147 159 459 147 159 459  147 159 459 147 159 459 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  10 000 000 9 204 954  1 233 377     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341 
Sum shipping costs  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024 
           
Profit    111 044 935 111 839 981  119 811 558 121 044 935  121 044 935 121 044 935 
Taxes   29 982 132 30 196 795  32 349 121 32 682 132  32 682 132 32 682 132 
Profit after taxes  81 062 803 81 643 186  87 462 437 88 362 803  88 362 803 88 362 803 
           
Loan payments  15 900 915 16 695 961  24 667 538     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 70 974 388 70 759 725  68 607 399 94 175 303  94 175 303 106 950 303 
           
NPV 1 116 774 900          
IRR 0,2577          
           
 
The investment in Case 1 should considered to be very profitable. From the spreadsheet 
printout (also found in Appendix 2) we can see that the return on capital is enormous, the 
NPV is 4,46 times bigger than the initial investment. The payback period, the time required to 
recover the cost of the asset is 5 years. This is a positive argument for the undertaking of the 
project considering that the lifetime of the asset is 40 years. 
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Using the measurement of NPV and IRR we answer the sub-research question: What is the 
value of investing in a ship selling LNG on a long-term contract to the European market for a 
Norwegian producer? The answer is                 , with an                  
which exceeds the hurdle rate of 4,7672%.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Price sensitivity analysis, Case 1 
 
If we in “the negotiations” of a forward price had agreed upon a higher price, e.g. 9 
USD/mmBtu, the NPV of the investment would have been over 29% larger. That such a 
minor change in price amounts to a significant NPV increase, really demonstrates the huge 
volumes of gas that is transported and how sensitive the NPV is to price changes. The 
indifference curve (Figure 8.3) for Case 1 shows us how affected the NPV is to changes in the 
rate of return. 
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Figure 8.3: Indifference curve, Case 1 
 
As we can see from the graph above the WACC have to be above 25% in order for the NPV 
of the project to be negative, which corresponds with the IRR of 25,77% 
 
8.7 ANALYSIS OF CASE 2 
In Case 2 the LNGC is selling LNG on spot to Milford Haven, UK. Every one of the three 
price scenarios has monthly changes, except for the medium scenarios. We have already 
assumed that the vessel is ready to use in the beginning of 2016, and the minor monthly 
changes in the medium scenario happens before that time. In the two other price scenarios the 
price increases/decreases until it stabilizes in 2024, as illustrated in Figure 7.20. Hence, to 
calculate the annual revenues in all spot cases the following formula was used: 
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What is the value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot or short-term contracts to the 
European market for a Norwegian producer? Firstly, the investment in Case 2 is highly 
profitable. The NPV is positive in all three price scenarios, and ranging between 693 and 3179 
million USD, low to high respectively. The spreadsheets for Case 2 can be found in Appendix 
3. The payback period in Case 2 is even shorter than for Case 1. Already after two years of 
usage in all three price scenarios, the vessel has recovered its cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Price sensitivity analysis, Case 2 
 
The break-even price in Case 2 is 7,02 USD/mmBtu. As we can see from the figure above, the 
NPV of the project in a high risk case is very sensitive to changes in price. Even a change 
from 9 to 8 USD/mmBtu reduces the NPV over 50%. This demonstrates the high risk, but 
also the high potential profit of investing in a LNG ship with spot trade. This also applies to 
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Case 2 Scenario NPV IRR 
 Low 693 million USD 40,23% 
 Medium 1 588 million USD 53,72% 
 High 3 179 million USD 71,01% 
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the other high risk cases, with their respective numbers, as costs and number of annual round 
trips differ.  
 
The NPV under Case 1 is more predictable because the forward contract adds certainty to the 
cash flows of the project. In Case 2 the NPV is based on uncertain input data (prices), which 
means the cash flows are perceived as unsafe. However, it is important to remember that the 
cash flows in all the spot cases are based on a higher rate of return because of higher risk.  
 
 
Figure 8.5: Indifference curve, Case 2 
 
Figure 8.5 shows the indifference curves in Case 2, given the three price scenarios. (Milford 
Haven is referred to as “MH”.) There is a very big difference between the NPVs in the three 
price scenarios, which again stresses how sensitive the NPV of the project is to price changes. 
Yet, the project in Case 2 has a lot of room for uncertainty as the IRR in the low price 
scenario is 40,23 %, and even higher for the two other scenarios.   
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8.8 ANALYSIS OF CASE 3 
The same formula to calculate annual revenue was applied in the analysis of Case 3. In this 
case we investigated the value using the NSR and the Suez Canal as shipping routes to the 
Japanese market, in order to answer the sub research question: What is the value of investing 
in a ship selling LNG on spot or short-term contracts to the Japanese market for a Norwegian 
producer? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Price sensitivity analysis, Case 3 
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Suez only Low -125 million USD 1,68% 
 Medium 176 million USD 13,43% 
 High 540 million USD 22,25% 
    
Suez and NSR Low -65 million USD 4,73% 
 Medium 288 million USD 16,83% 
 High 714 million USD 26,61% 
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First, we looked at only using the Suez Canal. This gave a NPV ranging between -125 and 
540 million USD, with a break-even price of 12,18 USD/mmBtu.  
 
However, utilizing the NSR during the summer months offers a much greater value. The 
reason for this is the costs and timed saved, which is 753 913 USD and 17,6 days per round 
trip when using the NSR. The NPV for this alternative ranged between -7 and 714 million 
USD, whereas the break-even price was 11,3 USD/mmBtu. By comparing the curves for NPV 
relative to a constant price in Figure 8.7, we see that using the NSR yields an increasingly 
higher NPV with higher prices than just using the Suez Canal. The spreadsheets for Case 3 are 
shown in Appendix 4. The difference between the alternatives is also reflected in the payback 
period. The Suez only alternative is paid back in 2028 and 2020, given medium and high price 
scenario. Of course, in the low price scenario the Suez alternative will never pay back the 
initial investment, as the NPV is negative. Combining the NSR and the Suez Canal is paid 
back in 2022 and 2019, medium and high respectively. In the low price scenario also this 
alternative will never be profitable.   
 
 
Figure 8.7: Indifference curve, Case 3 
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Figure 8.7 shows the indifference curves for high and medium price scenario for the two 
alternatives in Case 3. Low price scenarios for both alternatives are not included because the 
NPVs were negative. The curves show that there is not as much room for uncertainty as in 
Case 2. Hence, a risk averse investor would prefer Case 2 over 3, because it offers both a 
higher return and higher stability.    
 
8.9 ANALYSIS OF CASE 4 
In Case 4 we looked at sales to Japan through NSR during the summer, and sales to UK the 
rest of the year. From the assumptions made about the available usage time of NSR, we have 
two options: to use the NSR for 3 round trips, or to use it for 3,5 round trips and traveling 
back via the Suez Canal. The last option of these two gave a significantly lower NPV than the 
first option. This can be explained by the increased costs and traveling time, which is better 
used between Hammerfest and Milford Haven. This is further supported by looking at the 
NPVs for Case 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot or short-term contracts to the 
European and/or Japanese market for a Norwegian producer? The best option in Case 4 gave 
a NPV ranging between 601 and 2739 million USD, and a brake-even price of 7,53 
USD/mmBtu. The NPV is positive in all three price scenarios, and the spreadsheets can be 
found in Appendix 5 
 
Case 4 Scenario NPV IRR 
 Low 601 million USD 38,69% 
 Medium 1 061 million USD 39,63% 
 High 2 739 million USD 67,05% 
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Figure 8.8: Indifference curve, Case 4 
 
In Figure 8.8 we can see that the indifference curves are somewhere in the middle of those 
found in Case 2 and 3, and seem quite logical as Case 4 is a combination of them. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we will compare the analyses of the cases in order to answer the main research 
question. In addition, an evaluation of the research will be presented, including its limitations 
and suggestions to further research.  
 
9.1 CASE COMPARISONS 
In Figure 9.1 we have put all the cases and their NPVs for all three different price scenarios, 
including the NPV for the forward contract. We can see that there is a very significant 
difference in NPV, especially between the cases towards the UK market and only towards the 
Japan market. The two cases involving selling to Milford Haven on spot, clearly has the 
highest value. It is interesting to see that even selling with a forward contract to Milford 
Haven gives a higher NPV than selling only to Japan on spot, in all three price scenarios. In 
addition, Case 1 has no price risk! We can also see that in the low price scenario selling to 
Japan in Case 3 is not profitable. 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Comparison of NPVs with different price scenarios 
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Is there an added value of having the possibility to export LNG with spot or short-term 
contracts versus having a secure long-term contract towards Europe?  
From what we have discussed so far about selling only to the Japanese market, as done in case 
3, there is no value added. The main reason for this is the time difference. By delivering to 
Milford Haven the LNGC can almost do 5 round trips, compared to the time it takes for a 
round trip to Yokohama. Even when going through the timesaving NSR, the ship can do 
almost 3,5 trips more. In other words the Milford Haven route is much more effective in terms 
of transport volume, and this has a strong time effect on the NPV for both Case 1 and 2. When 
further evaluating the NPV, we also see that the different financing structure and cost of 
capital is affecting it both directly and indirectly. Firstly, the low and high risk cases discounts 
the cash flows with distinctive rates. Secondly, the interest payments are not the same.  
 
What is the increased value of investing in a ship selling LNG on spot instead of a long-term 
contract for a Norwegian producer? 
The main research question was formulated with “what is the increased value”. This obliges 
us to compare the two distribution alternatives: spot sales and long-term contract sales, which 
is represented by delta (Δ) NPV: 
 
                   
 
where,         is the NPV calculated for the high risk cases, and       for the low risk 
case. In figure 9.2 every Δ NPV is calculated.  
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Figure 9.2: Delta NPV 
 
As mentioned above, we can confirm from figure 9.2 that there is no value added selling 
when on spot to only Japan, instead of using a forward contract to UK. This holds in all the 
three price scenarios. The NPV method values money higher today, than money in the future. 
Case 2 gives a higher Δ NPV than Case 3 and 4, because the value is created in a shorter 
period of time, making it more valuable today. We also see that any case or alternative 
involving selling to Milford Haven, with medium or high price scenario, yield the highest Δ 
NPVs. Of these, Case 2 is the “greatest”. Therefore, to answer the main research question we 
compare the Δ NPV between Case 1 and Case 2. The low price scenario towards Milford 
Haven on spot yields a negative Δ NPV of -423 million USD, which indicates that for an 
investor with a pessimistic view on the future price, the forward contract is the best 
alternative. In the medium price scenario the Δ NPV is 471 million USD, and in the high price 
scenario it is a massive 2 062 million USD, which suggests that taking risk can pay off 
massively.   
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9.1.1 UTILIZING FREE DESTINATION SHIPPING 
With an investment in a ship for free destination, there is no obligation to ship towards one 
particular buyer. In an inefficient market with price differences, this can be seen as a natural 
hedge. Since none of the cargo is hedged for price fluctuations there is a potential to take 
advantage of the market offering the highest price. Comparing the profitability of sending 
either to the European or the Japanese market, the time and volume aspect has to be taken into 
consideration. By shipping towards Milford Haven one can sell a larger volume in a shorter 
period compared to Yokohama. In order to account for these factors, the NPV for case 2 and 
case 3 with different average prices over the lifetime of the LNGC was put into a chart.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Free destination analysis 
 
As we can see from the figure above, if the price equals to 8 USD/mmBtu in the European 
market, then the price has to be above 15,5 USD/mmBtu for it to be more profitable to ship 
towards the Japan market. Then, if the price is 11 USD/mmBtu in the European market, then 
the price has to be almost 29 USD/mmBtu in the Japan market. This illustrates how much the 
time and volume affects the NPV. Nevertheless, if the European market were to take a 
downturn, the natural hedge proffers Japan as an alternative. 
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Under our assumptions, we do not see that Norway as a supplier of natural gas would miss out 
on economic values by not selling on spot to the Japanese/Asian market. We do however see 
that if the price difference would exceed further than the level of our calculations, or under an 
economic downturn in Europe, the Japanese market would be very attractive. It is very 
important to state that these calculations are based on certain assumptions. If for instance 
there was a volume restriction on LNG cargos from the Snøhvit field, the case valuations 
could be different. 
 
9.2 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH 
9.2.1 LIMITATIONS 
A limitation that should be considered in this thesis is the assumption of continuous supply of 
LNG from the plant. In a portfolio of vessels, an additional vessel picking up supply would 
require further extensive planning. If the production of LNG is thought to be nearly linear 
(either on or off), pick-ups should happen with the same consistency. By that logic, vessels 
should be assigned to a voyage plan going by other ports and plants, rather than just one route, 
e.g. Hammerfest-Yokohama-Hammerfest. In that way the vessels would come regularly by 
Hammerfest. If not done, some of the vessels would come with short intervals, while others 
just once in a while, and possibly arriving to load LNG at the same time. Of course, this is 
highly dependent on the production and storage capacity of the plant. In addition, the vessels 
could be used to load LNG from other plants in the portfolio of the Norwegian producer.  
 
Lastly, the Snøhvit field has a limited amount of gas reserves. Therefore, assuming that this 
vessel in the investment analysis comes to pick up cargoes regularly, in addition to those 
already supplying long-term contracts, is a simplification. Nonetheless, this was necessary to 
isolate the analysis to a Norwegian standpoint. In Case 2, where the most LNG is picked up, 
the volumes are substantial, but do not exceed the annual production. However, it is likely 
that it would have affected the already existing vessel portfolio. Our suggestion to further 
research is to investigate the value of introducing a vessel solely for spot trade in a vessel 
portfolio. Alternatively or including, finding the value of increasing annual production of a 
LNG plant e.g. the Melkøya plant (to stay in the Norwegian context). If the method of 
discounted cash flows is used, both suggestions will most likely observe the same time effect 
as seen in this study, thus get increased values.   
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9.2.2 CONTRIBUTION 
The choice of method helped us answer the main research question, and we consider our 
conclusion to be reasonable. By comparing the analyses of the cases we were able to see a 
value difference for the two different usages of a LNGC. However, we can surely assume that 
the industry already knows this since there has been and increasing trend of spot and short-
term trade. Although this thesis might not be a contribution to new knowledge, we have by 
doing the research formalized it. Consequently, we now have a basis to describe the construct 
of value difference between investing in a LNGC for spot-trade and a long-term agreement.   
 
9.3 SUMMING UP 
In the strategic analysis in Chapter 6, we saw that there is a potential for profitability in the 
industry as there were limited threats from market forces. The investment analysis confirmed 
that there is a high potential value in exporting LNG, using both long-term agreements and 
spot trade. Price risk is a very important factor in the LNG risk management. The regional 
prices drive the volumes to a certain degree, but we have found that in today’s value, distance 
to the market is just as, or even more important. Investing in a LNGC used for spot trade will 
most likely be rewarded as the potential compensation for taking a higher risk is significant. 
Spot trade is a very relevant topic in the LNG industry and in the discussion about risk 
appetite. Movement away from long-term contracts caused by price spread stands in contrast 
to the risk aversion seen in multinational oil and gas companies. Even though an investment 
analysis takes risk and reward into consideration, a non-hedged position will never guarantee 
an investment. Ultimately, such an investment depends on the risk aversion of the Norwegian 
producer.   
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APPENDIX 1 
Conversion factors (IGU, 2014): 
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APPENDIX 2  
Cash flows in Case 1, forward contract to Milford Haven 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Forward contract  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven          
Sales volume   113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263 
Sales price   8,50 8,50  8,50 8,50  8,50 8,50 
Revenues   966 222 737 966 222 737  966 222 737 966 222 737  966 222 737 966 222 737 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310 
Margin after OPEX  300 325 427 300 325 427  300 325 427 300 325 427  300 325 427 300 325 427 
Special taxes  0,51  153 165 968 153 165 968  153 165 968 153 165 968  153 165 968 153 165 968 
Margin after special taxes  147 159 459 147 159 459  147 159 459 147 159 459  147 159 459 147 159 459 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  10 000 000 9 204 954  1 233 377     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341 
Sum shipping costs  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024 
           
Profit    111 044 935 111 839 981  119 811 558 121 044 935  121 044 935 121 044 935 
Taxes   29 982 132 30 196 795  32 349 121 32 682 132  32 682 132 32 682 132 
Profit after taxes  81 062 803 81 643 186  87 462 437 88 362 803  88 362 803 88 362 803 
           
Loan payments  15 900 915 16 695 961  24 667 538     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 70 974 388 70 759 725  68 607 399 94 175 303  94 175 303 106 950 303 
           
NPV 1 116 774 900          
IRR 0,2577          
           
 
 
(On all cash flows in all cases the salvage value is added in year 2055 as an income minus 27% taxes) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Case 2: 
 
Cash flows in case 2, spot to Milford Haven - Low price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven          
Sales volume   113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263 
Sales price   10,29 10,02  8,00 8,00  8,00 8,00 
Revenues   1 169 271 603 1 138 579 822  909 386 105 909 386 105  909 386 105 909 386 105 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310 
Margin after OPEX  503 374 293 472 682 512  243 488 796 243 488 796  243 488 796 243 488 796 
Special taxes  0,51  256 720 890 241 068 081  124 179 286 124 179 286  124 179 286 124 179 286 
Margin after special taxes  246 653 404 231 614 431  119 309 510 119 309 510  119 309 510 119 309 510 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341 
Sum shipping costs  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024 
           
Profit    205 538 880 191 441 088  90 975 731 93 194 986  93 194 986 93 194 986 
Taxes   55 495 497 51 689 094  24 563 447 25 162 646  25 162 646 25 162 646 
Profit after taxes  150 043 382 139 751 994  66 412 283 68 032 339  68 032 339 68 032 339 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 146 444 073 135 211 504  50 032 229 73 844 839  73 844 839 86 619 839 
           
NPV 693 456 728          
IRR 0,4023          
 
The sales price in the all spreadsheets is the mean price for the whole year.  Therefore, the sum of multiplying 
volume and price for each year is not accurate. (We refer to Chaper 8.7.)   
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Cash flows in case 2, spot to Milford Haven - Medium price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven          
Sales volume   113 673 264 113 673 264  113 673 264 113 673 264  113 673 264 113 673 264 
Sales price   10,88 10,88  10,88 10,88  10,88 10,88 
Revenues   1 236 765 103 1 236 765 103  1 236 765 103 1 236 765 103  1 236 765 103 1 236 765 103 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310 
Margin after OPEX  570 867 793 570 867 793  570 867 793 570 867 793  570 867 793 570 867 793 
Special taxes  0,51  291 142 575 291 142 575  291 142 575 291 142 575  291 142 575 291 142 575 
Margin after special taxes  279 725 219 279 725 219  279 725 219 279 725 219  279 725 219 279 725 219 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341 
Sum shipping costs  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024 
           
Profit    238 610 695 239 551 876  251 391 440 253 610 695  253 610 695 253 610 695 
Taxes   64 424 888 64 679 006  67 875 689 68 474 888  68 474 888 68 474 888 
Profit after taxes  174 185 807 174 872 869  183 515 751 185 135 807  185 135 807 185 135 807 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 170 586 498 170 332 379  167 135 697 190 948 307  190 948 307 203 723 307 
           
NPV 1 587 979 430          
IRR 0,5372          
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Cash flows in case 2, spot to Milford Haven - High price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven          
Sales volume   113 673 264 113 673 264  113 673 264 113 673 264  113 673 264 113 673 264 
Sales price   11,94 12,42  16,00 16,00  16,00 16,00 
Revenues   1 357 258 762 1 411 821 928  1 818 772 210 1 818 772 210  1 818 772 210 1 818 772 210 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310  665 897 310 665 897 310 
Margin after OPEX  691 361 452 745 924 619  1 152 874 901 1 152 874 901  1 152 874 901 1 152 874 901 
Special taxes  0,51  352 594 341 380 421 555  587 966 199 587 966 199  587 966 199 587 966 199 
Margin after special taxes  338 767 112 365 503 063  564 908 701 564 908 701  564 908 701 564 908 701 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683  7 320 683 7 320 683 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341  7 506 341 7 506 341 
Sum shipping costs  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024  20 302 024 20 302 024 
           
Profit    297 652 587 325 329 720  536 574 922 538 794 177  538 794 177 538 794 177 
Taxes   80 366 199 87 839 024  144 875 229 145 474 428  145 474 428 145 474 428 
Profit after taxes  217 286 389 237 490 696  391 699 693 393 319 749  393 319 749 393 319 749 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 213 687 080 232 950 206  375 319 639 399 132 249  399 132 249 411 907 249 
           
NPV 3 179 205 553          
IRR 0,7101          
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APPENDIX 4 
Case 3: 
 
Cash flows in case 3, spot to Yokohama (Suez Canal only) - Low price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez only)         
Sales volume   22 151 136 22 151 136  22 151 136 22 151 136  22 151 136 22 151 136 
Sales price   14,19 13,58  9,00 9,00  9,00 9,00 
Revenues   314 302 514 300 722 099  199 360 183 199 360 183  199 360 183 199 360 183 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 137 998 456 137 998 456  137 998 456 137 998 456  137 998 456 137 998 456 
Margin after OPEX  176 304 059 162 723 643  61 361 727 61 361 727  61 361 727 61 361 727 
Special taxes  0,51  89 915 070 82 989 058  31 294 481 31 294 481  31 294 481 31 294 481 
Margin after special taxes  86 388 989 79 734 585  30 067 246 30 067 246  30 067 246 30 067 246 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131 
Sum shipping costs  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511 
           
Profit    45 694 978 39 981 755  2 153 980 4 373 235  4 373 235 4 373 235 
Taxes   12 337 644 10 795 074  581 575 1 180 774  1 180 774 1 180 774 
Profit after taxes  33 357 334 29 186 681  1 572 406 3 192 462  3 192 462 3 192 462 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 29 758 025 24 646 191  -14 807 648 9 004 962  9 004 962 21 779 962 
           
NPV -125 929 377          
IRR 0,0168          
 
The sales price in the all spreadsheets is the mean price for the whole year.  Therefore, the sum of multiplying 
volume and price for each year is not accurate. (We refer to Chaper 8.7.)   
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Cash flows in case 3, spot to Yokohama (Suez Canal only) - Medium price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez only)         
Sales volume   22 151 136 22 151 136  22 151 136 22 151 136  22 151 136 22 151 136 
Sales price   14,37 14,37  14,37 14,37  14,37 14,37 
Revenues   318 311 758 318 311 758  318 311 758 318 311 758  318 311 758 318 311 758 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 137 998 456 137 998 456  137 998 456 137 998 456  137 998 456 137 998 456 
Margin after OPEX  180 313 303 180 313 303  180 313 303 180 313 303  180 313 303 180 313 303 
Special taxes  0,51  91 959 784 91 959 784  91 959 784 91 959 784  91 959 784 91 959 784 
Margin after special taxes  88 353 518 88 353 518  88 353 518 88 353 518  88 353 518 88 353 518 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131 
Sum shipping costs  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511 
           
Profit    47 659 507 48 600 688  60 440 252 62 659 507  62 659 507 62 659 507 
Taxes   12 868 067 13 122 186  16 318 868 16 918 067  16 918 067 16 918 067 
Profit after taxes  34 791 440 35 478 502  44 121 384 45 741 440  45 741 440 45 741 440 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 31 192 131 30 938 012  27 741 330 51 553 940  51 553 940 64 328 940 
           
NPV 176 116 348          
IRR 0,1343          
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Cash flows in case 3, spot to Yokohama (Suez Canal only) - High price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez only)         
Sales volume   22 151 136 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263  113 673 263 113 673 263 
Sales price   16,46 16,88  20,00 20,00  20,00 20,00 
Revenues   364 643 995 373 906 003  443 022 628 443 022 628  443 022 628 443 022 628 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 137 998 456 137 998 456  137 998 456 137 998 456  137 998 456 137 998 456 
Margin after OPEX  226 645 540 235 907 548  305 024 173 305 024 173  305 024 173 305 024 173 
Special taxes  0,51  115 589 225 120 312 849  155 562 328 155 562 328  155 562 328 155 562 328 
Margin after special taxes  111 056 314 115 594 698  149 461 845 149 461 845  149 461 845 149 461 845 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131 
Sum shipping costs  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511 
           
Profit    70 362 303 75 841 868  121 548 579 123 767 834  123 767 834 123 767 834 
Taxes   18 997 822 20 477 304  32 818 116 33 417 315  33 417 315 33 417 315 
Profit after taxes  51 364 481 55 364 564  88 730 462 90 350 518  90 350 518 90 350 518 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 47 765 172 50 824 074  72 350 408 96 163 018  96 163 018 108 938 018 
           
NPV 540 046 544          
IRR 0,2225          
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Cash flows in case 3, spot to Yokohama (Suez/NSR) - Low price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez/NSR)         
Sales volume   25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224 
Sales price   14,19 13,58  9,00 9,00  9,00 9,00 
Revenues   367 668 659 351 782 394  233 210 005 233 210 005  233 210 005 233 210 005 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 161 103 220 161 103 220  161 103 220 161 103 220  161 103 220 161 103 220 
Margin after OPEX  206 565 439 190 679 174  72 106 786 72 106 786  72 106 786 72 106 786 
Special taxes  0,51  105 348 374 97 246 379  36 774 461 36 774 461  36 774 461 36 774 461 
Margin after special taxes  101 217 065 93 432 795  35 332 325 35 332 325  35 332 325 35 332 325 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131 
Sum shipping costs  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511 
           
Profit    60 523 054 53 679 965  7 419 059 9 638 314  9 638 314 9 638 314 
Taxes   16 341 225 14 493 591  2 003 146 2 602 345  2 602 345 2 602 345 
Profit after taxes  44 181 830 39 186 375  5 415 913 7 035 969  7 035 969 7 035 969 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 40 582 521 34 645 885  -10 964 141 12 848 469  12 848 469 25 623 469 
           
NPV -65 111 640          
IRR 0,0473          
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Cash flows in case 3, spot to Yokohama (Suez/NSR) - Medium price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez/NSR)         
Sales volume   25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224 
Sales price   14,37 14,37  14,37 14,37  14,37 14,37 
Revenues   372 358 642 372 358 642  372 358 642 372 358 642  372 358 642 372 358 642 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 161 103 220 161 103 220  161 103 220 161 103 220  161 103 220 161 103 220 
Margin after OPEX  211 255 422 211 255 422  211 255 422 211 255 422  211 255 422 211 255 422 
Special taxes  0,51  107 740 265 107 740 265  107 740 265 107 740 265  107 740 265 107 740 265 
Margin after special taxes  103 515 157 103 515 157  103 515 157 103 515 157  103 515 157 103 515 157 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131 
Sum shipping costs  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511 
           
Profit    62 821 146 63 762 327  75 601 891 77 821 146  77 821 146 77 821 146 
Taxes   16 961 709 17 215 828  20 412 511 21 011 709  21 011 709 21 011 709 
Profit after taxes  45 859 436 46 546 499  55 189 380 56 809 436  56 809 436 56 809 436 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 42 260 127 42 006 009  38 809 326 62 621 936  62 621 936 75 396 936 
           
NPV 288 219 122          
IRR 0,1683          
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Cash flows in case 3, spot to Yokohama (Suez/NSR) - High price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez/NSR)         
Sales volume   25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224 
Sales price   16,46 16,88  20,00 20,00  20,00 20,00 
Revenues   426 557 736 437 392 361  518 244 456 518 244 456  518 244 456 518 244 456 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 161 103 220 161 103 220  161 103 220 161 103 220  161 103 220 161 103 220 
Margin after OPEX  265 454 516 276 289 142  357 141 237 357 141 237  357 141 237 357 141 237 
Special taxes  0,51  135 381 803 140 907 462  182 142 031 182 142 031  182 142 031 182 142 031 
Margin after special taxes  130 072 713 135 381 679  174 999 206 174 999 206  174 999 206 174 999 206 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380  12 329 380 12 329 380 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131  2 077 131 2 077 131 
Sum shipping costs  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511  19 881 511 19 881 511 
           
Profit    89 378 702 95 628 849  147 085 940 149 305 195  149 305 195 149 305 195 
Taxes   24 132 249 25 819 789  39 713 204 40 312 403  40 312 403 40 312 403 
Profit after taxes  65 246 452 69 809 060  107 372 736 108 992 792  108 992 792 108 992 792 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 61 647 143 65 268 570  519 504 678 114 805 292  114 805 292 127 580 292 
           
NPV 713 941 860          
IRR 0,2661          
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APPENDIX 5 
Case 4: 
 
Cash flows in case 4, spot to Milford Haven combined with NSR - Low price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven/NSR          
Sales volume   84 537 912 84 537 912  84 537 912 84 537 912  84 537 912 84 537 912 
Sales price   11,88 11,46  8,42 8,42  8,42 8,42 
Revenues   1 004 310 400 968 522 684  711 527 430 711 527 430  711 527 430 711 527 430 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 498 419 575 498 419 575  498 419 575 498 419 575  498 419 575 498 419 575 
Margin after OPEX  505 890 825 470 103 108  213 107 855 213 107 855  213 107 855 213 107 855 
Special taxes  0,51  258 004 321 239 752 585  108 685 006 108 685 006  108 685 006 108 685 006 
Margin after special taxes  247 886 504 230 350 523  104 422 849 104 422 849  104 422 849 104 422 849 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   8 994 503 8 994 503  8 994 503 8 994 503  8 994 503 8 994 503 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   8 750 136 8 750 136  8 750 136 8 750 136  8 750 136 8 750 136 
Sum shipping costs  23 219 639 23 219 639  23 219 639 23 219 639  23 219 639 23 219 639 
           
Profit    203 854 365 187 259 565  78 924 729 75 390 710  75 390 710 75 390 710 
Taxes   55 040 679 50 560 083  21 309 677 20 355 492  20 355 492 20 355 492 
Profit after taxes  148 813 686 136 699 482  57 615 052 55 035 218  55 035 218 55 035 218 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 145 214 377 132 158 992  41 234 998 60 847 718  60 847 718 73 622 718 
           
NPV 601 057 015          
IRR 0,3869          
 
 
The sales price in the all spreadsheets is the mean price for the whole year.  Therefore, the sum of multiplying 
volume and price for each year is not accurate. (We refer to Chaper 8.7.)   
  
139 
 
Cash flows in case 4, spot to Milford Haven combined with NSR - Medium price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Yokohama (Suez/NSR)         
Sales volume   25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224  25 912 224 25 912 224 
Sales price   14,37 14,37  14,37 14,37  14,37 14,37 
Revenues   929 917 037 929 917 037  929 917 037 929 917 037  929 917 037 929 917 037 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 498 419 575 498 419 575  498 419 575 498 419 575  498 419 575 498 419 575 
Margin after OPEX  431 497 462 431 497 462  431 497 462 431 497 462  431 497 462 431 497 462 
Special taxes  0,51  220 063 705 220 063 705  220 063 705 220 063 705  220 063 705 220 063 705 
Margin after special taxes  211 433 756 211 433 756  211 433 756 211 433 756  211 433 756 211 433 756 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value (year 
40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   8 994 503 8 994 503  8 994 503 8 994 503  8 994 503 8 994 503 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   8 750 136 8 750 136  8 750 136 8 750 136  8 750 136 8 750 136 
Sum shipping costs  23 219 639 23 219 639  23 219 639 23 219 639  23 219 639 23 219 639 
           
Profit    167 401 617 168 342 798  180 182 362 182 401 617  182 401 617 182 401 617 
Taxes   45 198 437 45 452 556  48 649 238 49 248 437  49 248 437 49 248 437 
Profit after taxes  122 203 181 122 890 243  131 533 124 133 153 181  133 153 181 133 153 181 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 118 603 872 118 349 753  115 153 070 138 965 681  138 965 681 151 740 681 
           
NPV 1 061 470 698          
IRR 0,3963          
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Cash flows in case 4, spot to Milford Haven combined with NSR - High price scenario: 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 … 2025 2026 … 2054 2055 
All numbers in USD  Delivery of vessel       
Spot           
Vessel lifetime  1 2  10 11  39 40 
Melkøya ↔ Milford Haven/NSR         
Sales volume   84 537 912 84 537 912  84 537 912 84 537 912  84 537 912 84 537 912 
Sales price   13,82 14,27  17,67 17,67  17,67 17,67 
Revenues   1 168 313 950 1 206 637 804  1 493 503 120 1 493 503 120  1 493 503 120 1 493 503 120 
           
OPEX Snøhvit 5,8 USD/mmBtu 498 419 575 498 419 575  498 419 575 498 419 575  498 419 575 498 419 575 
Margin after OPEX  669 894 375 708 218 228  995 083 545 995 083 545  995 083 545 995 083 545 
Special taxes  0,51  341 646 131 361 191 297  507 492 608 507 492 608  507 492 608 507 492 608 
Margin after special taxes  328 248 244 347 026 932  487 590 937 487 590 937  487 590 937 487 590 937 
           
Capex 125 000 000 125 000 000         
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Interest payments  15 000 000 14 058 819  2 219 255     
Salvage value 
(year 40) 
17 500 000          
           
Fuel costs   8 994 503 8 994 503  8 994 503 8 994 503  8 994 503 8 994 503 
Operational costs  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000  5 475 000 5 475 000 
Voyage costs   8 750 136 8 750 136  8 750 136 8 750 136  8 750 136 8 750 136 
Sum shipping costs  23 219 639 23 219 639  23 219 639 23 219 639  23 219 639 23 219 639 
           
Profit    284 216 105 303 935 974  456 339 543 458 558 798  458 558 798 458 558 798 
Taxes   76 738 348 82 062 713  123 810 875 123 810 875  123 810 875 123 810 875 
Profit after taxes  207 477 756 221 873 261  333 127 866 334 747 923  334 747 923 334 747 923 
           
Loan payments  9 411 809 10 352 990  22 192 554     
Depreciation   5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500  5 812 500 5 812 500 
Cash flows -125 000 000 -125 000 000 203 878 447 217 332 771  316 747 812 340 560 423  340 560 423 353 335 423 
           
NPV 2 739 444 700          
IRR 0,6705          
 
 
 
